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i 
ABSTRACT 
 
The expulsion of the German populations of Central and Eastern Europe after the Second 
World War was among the largest and most brutal forced migrations in human history. It is 
also one of the least understood. By focusing on the exile of one group, the Sudeten Germans 
of Czechoslovakia, this thesis seeks to discover why the postwar eviction took place. It traces 
the origins of the purge from the foundation of Czechoslovakia in 1918, and argues that the 
Republic’s long-serving president, Edvard Beneš, played a crucial role in the development 
and implementation of the plan. Through a detailed analysis of interwar minority rights, 
population transfers and the notion of German collective guilt, this thesis takes the position 
that the motivations behind postwar expulsions were shaped by the bitter experiences of the 
interwar period and that they were not, therefore, carried out as an impulsive act of 
retribution in the hour of victory. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
~ 
Expelled from their homes in the Sudetenland, East Prussia and the whole vast 
region of Germany taken over by the Poles ... a horde of Germans is struggling 
daily into Berlin – and being turned away because there is no food for them. The 
majority are old men, women and children. Some of these persons, too weak to 
wander further, have been seen under the bomb-wrecked roof of the Stettiner 
railway station dead or dying ... the figure of those [throughout Germany] for 
whom no food can be provided rises to 13,000,000 at least. This proportion of 
Germany’s population must die before winter if nothing is done. 
 
─ Victor Gollancz1 
 
    In the immediate years following the defeat of Germany, an ugly spectacle confronted 
Europe that was equal to all but the most barbaric acts of the Nazi regime. Despite the fact 
that the Second World War had been fought upon the principles of democracy and freedom, 
in the first years of peace that followed victory an event of unprecedented scale and suffering 
took place in the heart of the European continent. In an apparent act of retribution, twelve to 
fourteen million Germans were evicted from their ancestral homes in Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary and forced into the American, British and Soviet occupation zones of postwar 
Germany.
 2
  
                                                        
1
 Victor Gollancz, et al., ‘Save Europe Now: To the Editor, the Journal-Herald’, North Devon Journal, 13 
September 1945, p. 4. 
2
 There is no exact figure for the total number of Germans expelled during the ‘wild expulsions’ (1944–45) and 
the ‘organised expulsions’ (1946–47) due to a lack of population data during the Second World War. Alfred M. 
de Zayas places the total number of expellees at fifteen million using figures obtained from the German Federal 
Ministry of Expellees. More conservative estimates range between twelve and fourteen million. See Alfred M. 
 2 
    These expulsions, which had been approved in July 1945 by the Allied Powers at the 
Potsdam Conference, must surely rank among the greatest atrocities committed by humanity 
during the course of the twentieth-century. The overwhelming majority of expellees were 
women and children; the smallest group affected were adult males – the demographic most 
likely to have consorted with the Nazi regime.
3
 Contrary to the terms of the Potsdam 
Protocol, which sanctioned the ‘orderly and humane’ transfer of German populations, the 
expulsions were carried out with great brutality and vengeance. More than two million 
Germans did not survive this exercise in ethnic cleansing and many hundreds of thousands 
perished from starvation, malnutrition, disease and exposure as they made their westward 
transit in cattle trucks and freight trains to war-torn Germany.
4
 
 
THE EXPULSIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE 
 
    All too often, the history of twentieth-century Europe has been reduced to a battle between 
moral antitheses, and this tendency has for too long conditioned general perceptions of the 
postwar expulsion of the Germans from Central and Eastern Europe. According to 
conventional wisdom, the expulsion of German minorities was a just punishment for their 
                                                                                                                                                                            
de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans – Background, 
Execution, and Consequences (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. xix, xxi, xxv; R. M. Douglas, 
Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2012), p. 1; Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 111; G. C. Paikert, The German Exodus: A selective study on 
the post-World War II expulsion of German populations and its effects (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 
2, footnote 2; Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2005), pp. 25-26. For 
estimates of the number of Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia, see Piotr Pykel, ‘The Expulsion of the 
Germans from Czechoslovakia’, in Steffen Prauser and Arfon Rees, eds., The Expulsion of the ‘German’ 
Communities from Eastern Europe at the End of the Second World War, EUI Working Paper, HEC No. 2004/1 
(Florence: European Universities Institute, 2004), pp. 18-20; Zdeněk Radvanovský, ‘The Transfer of 
Czechoslovakia’s Germans and its Impact in the Border Region after the Second World War’, in Mark Cornwall 
and R. J. W. Evans, eds., Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe 1918 – 1948 (New York: Oxford 
University Press for the British Academy, 2007), pp. 224-225. 
3
 Douglas, Orderly and Humane, pp. 229-253. 
4
 There is also considerable ambiguity over the number of Germans who died during the expulsions. Estimates 
typically range from 500,000 to 2,000,000. See Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, p. xxv; Douglas, Orderly and 
Humane, p. 1. 
 3 
collusion with Nazi Germany as irredentist ‘fifth columns’.5 A far more robust analysis casts 
doubt upon such an assumption and indicates that the motivations behind the purge of 
German minorities and the machinery by which this project was achieved form part of a 
broader historical narrative whose penultimate chapter is the period between 1939 and 1945.  
 
    The postwar expulsion of the Germans was a poignant example of the brutality and misery 
that characterised the first-half of the twentieth-century. This period has been labelled ‘the 
era of violence’ by Ian Kershaw due to the exposure of civilian populations to the effects of 
total war and the increased capacity of the state to implement its political and racial 
ideologies.
6
 Although such violence was not endemic to Europe, some of its worst examples 
occurred on the continent between 1914 and 1945. As Tony Judt remarked, the vantage point 
of the end of the Second World War left ‘little of which to be proud and much about to feel 
embarrassed and more than a little guilty’.7 The expulsion of the Germans was a 
manifestation of this violent era that, in many regards, did not distinguish between the 
dictatorships and democracies. Both were the practitioners of state violence, whether on the 
subaltern periphery or within Europe itself. 
 
    A second broader trend to which the expulsions form part was the rise of nationalism and 
the process of nation-state formation in East-Central Europe.
8
 After the collapse of the 
Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, the intermingled ethnic boundaries of their former 
territories did not provide demographic foundations that gave way to naturally forming 
nation-states. In 1918–1919, the borders drawn and states created at the Paris Peace 
                                                        
5
 De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, p. 4. 
6
 Ian Kershaw, ‘War and Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe’, Contemporary European History, 
Vol. 14, Issue 1 (February 2005), p. 108. 
7
 Judt, Postwar, p. 41. 
8
 Matthew Frank, ‘Reconstructing the Nation-State: Population Transfers in Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–
48’, in Jessica Reinisch and Elizabeth White, eds., The Disentanglement of Populations: Migration, Expulsion 
and Displacement in Postwar Europe, 1944–49 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 27-47. 
 4 
Conference were as much arbitrary as they were principled.
9
 The failure to implement 
President Wilson’s call for self-determination for all nationalities not only sealed the fate of 
the Versailles settlement, but further exacerbated ethnic tensions by making the nation the 
key unit of political organisation. This was evident in the political structure of ‘nation-states’ 
such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, whose borders extended far beyond the core national 
groups they represented and thus brought within their jurisdiction German, Hungarian and 
Ukrainian minorities.
10
 As such, the chaotic emergence nation-states in East-Central Europe 
followed the earlier example set in the Balkans. Indeed, the International Commission of 
Inquiry into the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) spoke as much for the tragedy that was to unfold 
in the Sudetenland, East Prussia and western Poland in 1945 when it attributed the subversion 
of the principles of international law and humanity in the pursuit of state aggrandisement to 
the ‘megalomania of the national ideal’.11 
 
    As definitive expressions of violence and nationalism, the postwar expulsions were a 
symptomatic example of the dominant paradigms of twentieth-century Europe. In their 
immediate context, they were the final and most extensive forced mass migration of people 
arising from the Second World War.  Its victims were millions of German peasants and 
villagers that for the most part had little or nothing to do with Hitler.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9
 A recent work that provides an account of the Czech delegation at the Paris Peace Conference is Margaret 
Macmillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 229-242. 
10
 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Allen Lane, 1998), p. 9, 42. 
11
 International Commission of Inquiry into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, Report of the 
International Commission: To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914), pp. 61-62. 
 5 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND DISCOURSES 
 
    The postwar expulsion of Germans from Central and Eastern Europe has been largely 
neglected by historians of twentieth-century Europe. Only in recent decades has this 
unprecedented event featured in comprehensive studies and, even today, many elementary 
questions still remain to be fully answered: how were the expulsions implemented, who was 
responsible, how was the resettlement and integration of expellees into postwar Germany 
achieved, and what place does this traumatic event occupy in historical memory. 
Nonetheless, great scholarly advances have been made on the topic of the postwar expulsions 
since the first serious English-language study by Alfred de Zayas was published in 1977.
12
 
The impetus for the recent proliferation of scholarship on the expulsions can largely be 
attributed to the efforts of historians to place them within the broader historical context of 
ethnic cleansing and genocide – a particularly relevant field of study given the new wave of 
ethnic violence that has accompanied the turn of the present century. The result of such 
scholarly endeavours has been to reopen a brutal chapter in European history that has for too 
long been dismissed under the assumption that the German people simply deserved to be 
punished for Nazism. While much of this debate has taken place amongst European 
academics, the last two decades have seen a considerable and growing body of English-
language literature on the subject, to which this thesis is a contribution. 
 
                                                        
12
 Recent works that provide a comprehensive analysis of most aspects of the expulsions are Douglas, Orderly 
and Humane; Hugo Service, ‘Reinterpreting the Expulsion of Germans from Poland, 1945–49’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 47, No. 3 (July 2012), pp. 528-550; Reinisch and White, eds., The Disentanglement 
of Populations; Frank, Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfers in Context 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Radvanovský, ‘The Transfer of Czechoslovakia’s Germans and its 
Impact in the Border Region after the Second World War’, pp. 217-229; Prauser and Rees, eds., The Expulsion 
of the ‘German’ Communities from Eastern Europe at the End of the Second World War; Steven Bela Vardy 
and T. Hunt Tooley, eds., Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 
2003). 
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    In contrast to the approaches mentioned above, my thesis will be concerned with the 
political origins of the postwar expulsions. To incorporate the stories of all expellee groups 
into a single dissertation would be an impossible task, and partly for this reason, I have 
decided to focus on the expulsions as they affected a single group – the Sudeten Germans of 
Czechoslovakia. A further consideration behind this choice was the influential role played by 
President Edvard Beneš of Czechoslovakia in the development of expulsion as a remedy to 
Europe’s minority problems. As a long-serving foreign minister (1918–35) and president 
(1935–38 and 1945–48) of the Czechoslovak Republic and the leader of its London 
government-in-exile (1940–45), Beneš was uniquely placed at the helm of political power 
and at the centre of decision-making in both Prague and London.
13
 His political career, more 
or less, forms the bookends of this dissertation – from Czechoslovakia’s first national 
liberation in 1918 to its second in 1945. Between these years, the Czechs and the Sudeten 
Germans were engaged in a political and moral struggle over the very question of 
Czechoslovakia’s statehood and, more specifically, the legitimacy of Prague’s jurisdiction 
over the German-speaking border areas that would become known in due course as the 
‘Sudetenland’.  
 
    The battle between the Czechs and Germans had both local and international dimensions, 
and by taking account of the broader movements and trends in twentieth-century Europe, a 
more complex picture emerges of this struggle and its fateful conclusion. The toxic nexus of 
nationalism and violence forms the overarching narrative. A closer perspective reveals the 
inherent tensions between minority rights and state sovereignty, the threat to multiethnic 
states posed by national chauvinism, and the radicalising effect of total war on ethnic 
relations. This thesis will argue that, while at no stage inevitable, the expulsion of the 
                                                        
13
 The most recent English-language biography of Beneš is Zbyněk Zeman and Antonín Klimek, The Life of 
Edvard Beneŝ, 1884-1948: Czechoslovakia in Peace and War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).  
 7 
Sudeten Germans was a characteristic expression of the fractured European order that 
emerged after 1918.  
 
    I unfold my argument across three chapters. In the first, I argue that the tense Czech-
German relationship during the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938) sowed the seeds 
for the repudiation of minority rights, which, by removing the means for the protection of 
German minorities, enabled their mass eviction from the Czech lands. During the interwar 
period, Prague attempted to consolidate its hold over the German-speaking border areas, and 
in many cases, this infringed upon the political and cultural rights of the Sudeten Germans 
who were protected by the League of Nations.
14
 Czechoslovakia’s international obligation to 
uphold minority rights was a contentious issue during the interwar years, particularly given 
the possibility under the League’s minority system for external intervention in Czechoslovak 
internal affairs and the threat to state sovereignty that such intervention entailed. The rise of 
more extremist German parties in the 1930s, such as the Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP), and 
the coming to power of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party in neighbouring Germany 
permanently discredited the minority rights regime due to the fact that it could be exploited 
by irredentist minorities and expansionist states. Such fears eventuated in the Sudeten Crisis 
of September 1938, which resulted in the amputation of the Sudetenland and the 
dismemberment of the Czechoslovak state.  
 
    The influence of the interwar minority rights system on nationalism and violence in Europe 
has been the subject of a growing body of historical scholarship. Carole Fink’s detailed study 
of minority protection from 1878 to 1938 in Defending the Rights of Others (2004) is a fine 
                                                        
14
 For works on interwar minority rights, see Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities and the European 
Nation-State System (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Ludvík Němec, ‘Solution of the Minorities Problem’, in 
Victor S. Mamatey and Radomír Luža, A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918–1948 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 416-427. 
 8 
example of this approach and an important contribution to the history of international law and 
European ethnic-national relations.
15
 More recently, minority rights have increasingly 
featured in the discussion of human rights discourse and its evolution during the twentieth-
century. The efforts of Mark Mazower and Dirk Moses in this field have yielded some 
important results, and in particular, on the genesis of population transfers and ethnic 
cleansing in Europe and beyond, which, as Moses states, ‘attests to divergent humanitarian 
norms and to internal tensions within the emerging human rights regime’ of the postwar 
world.
16
 These themes will be further elaborated in chapters two and three. 
 
   In the second chapter, I will outline the origins of the mechanism by which the expulsion of 
the Germans from Czechoslovakia was implemented. Due to the opposition of President 
Beneš to the territorial changes enacted under the Munich Agreement, the 1919 borders of 
Czechoslovakia remained unchanged with the notable exception of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 
which was transferred to the Soviet Union. To resolve the problem of Czechoslovakia’s 
ethnic minorities, Beneš advocated the large-scale ‘population transfer’ of the overwhelming 
majority of Sudeten Germans. Although the envisaged transfer was on an altogether 
unprecedented scale, the wartime plans of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and the 
British Foreign Office looked to interwar examples of population transfers in Asia Minor, the 
Balkans, South Tyrol, the Baltic and Bessarabia.
17
 The shortcomings of minority protection 
in Europe had been evident since the 1920s, and population transfers were seen as a means to 
                                                        
15
 Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority 
Protection, 1878–1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
16
 A. Dirk Moses, ‘Partitions, Population “Transfers” and the Question of Human Rights and Genocide in the 
1930s and 1940s’, Seminar Paper, Human Rights and Imperialism in Historical Perspective, University of 
Sydney, 10–11 August 2012, pp. 1-21; Mark Mazower, ‘The Strange Triumph of Human Rights’, The 
Historical Journal, Vol. 47, Issue 2 (June 2004), pp. 379-398; Mazower, ‘Minorities and the League of Nations 
in Interwar Europe’, Daedalus, Vol. 126, No. 2 (1997), pp. 47-63; Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of 
Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
17
 Joseph B. Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1946); Anthony Read, The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939–1941 (New York: 
Norton, 1988). 
 9 
ameliorate internal ethnic tensions by creating more homogenous nation-states. I argue that 
Beneš became an advocate of population transfers from mid-September 1938 and, although 
he did not advocate such plans publicly until 1941, from the outset of his exile, the 
Czechoslovak leader massaged Allied opinion towards the view that the Sudeten Germans 
would have to be removed as part of a lasting postwar settlement.  
 
    Discussions of Beneš’ wartime role in the development of Allied expulsion policy is fairly 
limited. Although there is a general consensus across what literature exists in regard to his 
role in the annulment of Munich and the agreement of the Big Three to the principle of 
population transfers, there is nonetheless a substantial gap concerning the evolution of 
transfer proposals and the influence of interwar examples on their development.
18
 
Furthermore, many scholars quote Beneš’ public declaration of support for population 
transfers in September 1941 as the first instance of his conversion to the concept.
19
 This is not 
the case. As the historical record shows, Beneš first suggested a large-scale transfer of the 
Sudeten Germans through an intermediary to the French Government at the height of the 
Sudeten Crisis. This evidence indicates that the removal of Czechoslovakia’s German 
minority pre-dated the Second World War, and thus, future wartime initiatives were 
significantly shaped by the disastrous results of minority politics in the interwar era. 
 
    In the third and final chapter, I assess the notion of collective guilt as it applied to the 
Sudeten Germans for their ostensible association with the Nazi regime. President Beneš was 
among the foremost advocates of the ‘collective guilt’ doctrine, and used it to justify the 
drastic measure of wholesale expulsion. For many, the support that the Sudeten Germans 
                                                        
18
 For Beneš’s role in the annulment of Munich, see Vít Smetana, In the Shadow of Munich: British Policy 
Towards Czechoslovakia from the Endorsement to the Renunciation of the Munich Agreement, 1938–1942 
(Prague: Karolinum Press, 2008). 
19
 Beneš, ‘The New Order in Europe’, Nineteenth Century and After, Vol. 130 (July–December 1941), pp. 150-
155. 
 10 
gave the SdP and their supposed mass collusion with Nazi authorities during the war marked 
them as traitors to the Czechoslovak state. These claims require re-evaluation, for Beneš 
determination that the Sudeten Germans had been disloyal citizens was based upon 
questionable assumptions.  
 
    The notion of the collective guilt of the German people also needs to be examined 
alongside the promotion of human rights by the Allies during the Second World War. Not 
only were both concepts contradictory, but they were on occasion proclaimed by the same 
person. Beneš’ advocacy of ‘individual democratic rights’ while he pursued a policy of 
retribution against the Sudeten Germans is undoubtedly one of the greatest ironies of 
history.
20
 Yet, if understood in the context of the interwar period, this paradox becomes less 
nonsensical. Beneš conceived human rights as the protection of individual against arbitrary 
state power.
21
 This model substantially differed from the interwar minority rights system that 
granted special provisions to national minorities. As the history of Czechoslovakia 
demonstrated, minority rights could be exploited to overthrow the state by appealing to an 
international forum or a hostile predatory nation. In Beneš mind, the only way to solve the 
problem of national minorities was their physical removal from the state. 
 
A NOTE ON SOURCES 
 
    In terms of the primary sources used for this investigation, the vast majority have been 
drawn from government archives, official publications, political memoirs and speeches. 
Much of this material is in English, either by design or due to the efforts of translators. 
Archival material has primarily been drawn from the Cabinet Office (CAB) and Foreign 
                                                        
20
 Beneš, ‘The Organisation of Postwar Europe’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2 (January 1942), pp. 226-242. 
21
 Mazower, Dark Continent, p. 202. 
 11 
Office (FO) records of the United Kingdom, located at the British National Archives, Kew. I 
have, however, sought to complement this material with Czech and German sources where 
possible to include other perspectives. These documents have been obtained from the 
Londynsky Archiv (London Archive) of the Archiv Kanceláře prezidenta republiky 
(Presidential Office Archive of the Czech Republic) and the Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amts (Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry). I have also consulted 
the following publications on a regular basis for primary sources: Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, 1918–1945 (DGFP) for translated German documents, Documents on British 
Foreign Policy (DBFP), Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), and the League of 
Nations Official Journal (LNOJ). Where possible, I have sought to distil complex data into 
tables and have given direction where the reader may benefit by consulting them. 
 
    Historians are fortunate that President Beneŝ produced two political memoirs and many 
articles during his time in office at home and abroad.
22
 These have been invaluable sources in 
tracing the evolution of his thinking on the issues of minority rights, population transfers and 
postwar reconstruction. I have also drawn on the writings of Beneš’ contemporaries on these 
matters to provide different viewpoints of the events that unfolded between 1918 and 1945. 
23
 
These sources confirm that it was only by Beneŝ’ considerable diplomatic skill and his 
implacable hostility to the German people that the expulsions in Czechoslovakia took place 
as they did. 
 
                                                        
22 Edvard Beneŝ, Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneŝ: From Munich to New War and New Victory, trans. Godfrey 
Lias (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954); Beneŝ, My War Memoirs, trans. Paul Selver (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1928). 
23
 Hubert Ripka, Munich: Before and After: A fully documented Czechoslovak account of the crises of 
September 1938 and March 1939 with a detailed analysis of the repercussions of the Munich Agreement on the 
situation of Europe as a while and of Central Europe in particular, together with an essay on the reconstruction 
of a free Europe’, trans. Ida Šindelková and Edgar P. Young (London: Victor Gollancz, 1939); Ripka, The 
Future of the Czechoslovak Germans (London: Chiswick, 1944); Wenzel Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, 
trans. Kurt Glaser (London: Thames and Hudson, 1963). 
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Figure 1.1. President Edvard Beneš of Czechoslovakia (Courtesy of the Library of Congress, 
Prints and Photographs Division, Washington D.C.; LC-USW33-019089-C). 
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I 
TWILIGHT OF INTERNATIONALISM 
  
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE 
THE FIRST CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC 
~ 
Most states have been fashioned by the sword or have grown out of colonization. 
Czechoslovakia is the child of propaganda. 
─ H. A. L. Fisher1 
 
For nearly two decades the German as well as various other nationalities in 
Czechoslovakia, have been maltreated in the most unworthy manner, tortured, 
economically destroyed, and, above all, prevented from realising for themselves 
also the right of the nations to self-determination. 
─ Adolf Hitler2 
 
     On 28 October 1918 an independent state was declared in Bohemia by the Prague 
National Committee, and after administrative authority was surrendered in the afternoon by 
Vienna, enthusiastic crowds gathered in Wenceslas Square to remove the symbols of 
Austrian rule that had represented nearly four centuries of Hapsburg domination in Bohemia.
3
 
On the same day at Hotel Beau Rivage in Geneva, Edvard Beneš and representatives of the 
                                                        
1
 H.A.L. Fisher, A History of Europe (London: Edward Arnold, 1945), p. 1155. 
2
 Adolf Hitler, ‘Letter from the Führer to the British Prime Minister’, 23 September 1938, Documents on 
German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945 (hereafter DGFP), Series D, Vol. 2, Czechoslovakia and Germany, 1937–
1938 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 889. 
3
 Edvard Beneš, My War Memoirs, trans. Paul Selver (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928), p. 452-453; 
Nancy M. Wingfield, Flag Wars and Stone Saints: How the Bohemian Lands became Czech (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press), p. 135. 
 14 
Czech National Council met a delegation of politicians from Prague to determine the 
organisation of the newly declared Czechoslovak state.
 4
 It is strangely fitting that these 
negotiations concerning the creation of a new national democracy in the heart of Europe took 
place in Geneva, the future home of the League of Nations. Although Czechoslovakia was 
already a de facto state by the time the Paris Peace Conference convened, its independence 
was only officially recognised on 10 September 1919 with the signing of the Treaty of Saint-
Germain-en-Laye and a separate treaty outlining provisions for the ethnic minorities that 
were to fall within its recently drawn borders.
5
 
 
    This latter agreement constituted part of a general framework adopted under the auspices 
of the League of Nations to guarantee the political rights and cultural autonomy of Europe’s 
national minorities. Like its immediate neighbours, Poland and Yugoslavia, which emerged 
in the wake of the First World War, the Czechoslovak Republic that had been forged out of 
national revolution was, in fact, a multiethnic conglomeration of Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, 
Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenes (Map 1.1).
6
  The greatest threat to the viability of these new 
                                                        
4
 Beneš, My War Memoirs, pp. 440-441; Zbyněk Zeman and Antonín Klimek, The Life of Edvard Beneš, 1884-
1948: Czechoslovakia in War and Peace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 34. 
5
 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria; Protocol, Declaration and Special 
Declaration, St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919, Australian Treaty Series 1920, No. 3 (electronic), 
created 22 December 2002/updated 24 April 2003, hosted by the Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Australia <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/3.html>, viewed 14 May 2013.  States bound by 
minority treaties or minority clauses within the peace treaties concluded at the Paris Peace Conference were 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. See Athanasia 
Spiliopoulou Akermark, Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), pp. 104-105; Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, 
and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 268; 
Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-State System (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), pp. 73-94. For a thorough explanation of the legal aspects of minority rights, see Julius Stone, 
International Guarantees of Minority Rights: Procedure of the Council of the League of Nations in Theory and 
Practice (London: Oxford University Press, 1932). 
6
 R. J. W. Evans, ‘Introduction’, in Mark Cornwall and Evans, eds., Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist 
Europe, 1918–1948 (New York: Oxford University Press for the British Library, 2007), p. 2. For demographic 
data and census results, see Archiv Kanceláře prezidenta republiky (hereafter AKPR), Londynsky Archiv 
(hereafter LA), Carton 21, ‘Committee on Reconstruction: Economic and Statistical Seminar – Memorandum on 
Czechoslovak Population and Agricultural Over-Population in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Russia’, 1943, pp. 
1-15; Václav L. Beneš, ‘Czechoslovak Democracy and Its Problems, 1918–1920’, in Victor S. Mamatey and 
Radomír Luža, eds., A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918–1948 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1973), pp. 40, 42-43. 
 15 
states in the vast ethnic sea of Eastern Europe – where the intermingling of national identities 
made the imitation of the nation-state model of Western Europe highly problematic – was the 
temptation to national chauvinism. This resulted in the political exclusion of minority groups 
and the infringement of their cultural autonomy as outlined by the League’s minority treaties. 
Despite the principle of national self-determination espoused in President Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points, many ethnic minorities were denied this right and would suffer under the nationalist 
policies of the political regimes which replaced the multiethnic Hapsburg and Russian 
empires.
7
 Principal among this group were the Auslandsdeutschen – the German communities 
beyond the borders of the Reich after the peace settlement of 1919–1920.8  
 
     The injection of minority politics into international affairs during the interwar period – a 
product of the importance of national identity to Wilsonian internationalism – created the 
political and intellectual milieu in which statesman and bureaucrats would later consider mass 
expulsion as a remedy for civil strife and state conflict. The tenuous position of ethnic 
minorities had been appreciated in 1919, and in the years between the world wars 
international solutions were sought through the forum of the League of Nations that would 
address their grievances by strengthening the international protection of minority rights 
through legal means. It was the combination of the demise of the League, the intransigence of 
domestic politicians and the rise of fascism in the 1930s that brought about the renunciation 
of such international mechanisms in favour of nationalist solutions, including population 
transfers and mass expulsions that were practiced in the 1940s by both Nazi Germany and the 
Allied Powers.  
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    The traumatic years from 1918 to 1938 form the first chapter of events that led to the 
postwar expulsions. This can be discerned in the changing attitudes towards minority rights 
in Geneva and among the European political class over the period. In the era of liberal 
optimism in the 1920s, the principle of international protection was readily adopted and 
exercised by the League of Nations. However, in the 1930s, the perceived abuse of this 
system by an expansionist Germany and its infringement by the signatory states themselves 
led to the abandonment of minority rights in preference for the greater national 
homogeneity.
9
  
 
    In Czechoslovakia, the consequences of this broader trend can be perceived in the 
domestic struggle of Beneš and his national compatriots against an increasingly subversive 
Sudeten German minority. The former had carried out a ‘Czechoslovak’ national revolution 
in the closing months of 1918 under the principle of self-determination, whereas the Sudeten 
Germans, without their consent, were forcibly included in this new democracy.
10
 Under the 
leadership of Konrad Heinlein’s Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP) the Sudeten minority became 
increasingly radicalised, and with the active support of Nazi Germany, triggered a political 
crisis in 1938 that resulted in the partition and dissolution of the First Republic, and thus, the 
fall of Europe’s last democracy east of the Rhine.11 It would also prove the genesis of a belief 
that German minorities were a Nazified ‘fifth column’ that had sabotaged Czechoslovakia 
from inside – an auspicious portent of their future mass expulsion from Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
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CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MINORITY 
PROTECTION 
 
    The need to protect Europe’s ethnic minorities was not a new consideration when the issue 
was brought before the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Indeed, since the consolidation of 
the nation-state the need had existed to protect the civic and cultural rights of those outside 
the majority from its ‘centralising, homogenising and organising tendencies’.12 Such forms of 
protection have historically been enshrined in bilateral treaties between states or in 
diplomatic agreements conferring extra-territorial rights. Prior to the nationalist fervour of the 
nineteenth-century, minorities were typically defined by their religious beliefs and practice.
13
  
 
    The religious upheavals and state conflict caused by the Reformation and Counter-
Reformation led to a series of treaties that protected the religious liberties of minorities that 
were brought under the jurisdiction of a ruler who was not affiliated with their religious 
confession. Notable examples include the treaties of Vienna (1607) and Dresden (1745), 
which affirmed the tolerance of Protestants in Central and Eastern Europe. Similarly, the 
Treaty of Oliva (1660) that awarded Livonia and Pomerania to Sweden and the treaties of 
Nijmegen (1678) and Ryswick (1697), which altered the Franco-Dutch border in Flanders, 
contained clauses that protected the religious liberties of Catholics who inhabited these 
regions.
14
 In the Balkans and Near East, the persecution of Christian minorities provoked 
frequent intervention by members of the Concert of Europe in the internal affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire. The crumbling of Ottoman authority in Greece and the outbreak of 
rebellions elsewhere within the ‘sick man of Europe’ attracted foreign support throughout the 
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nineteenth-century. Two such examples are the interventions of France in the Druze-
Maronite conflict in Lebanon (1860), and Britain and Russia in the aftermath of the Bulgarian 
Atrocities (1876).
15
 In these instances, the persecution of minorities was used to further the 
diplomatic objectives of the Great Powers – a legacy to be disowned by the peacemakers in 
1919.  
 
    It was, however, the rise of nationalist sentiment in the nineteenth-century that resulted in a 
more conscious perception of civic and cultural rights beyond those of religious freedom. 
This was apparent in the Treaty of Berlin (1878) that recognised the independence of 
Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, all of which had been provinces of the Ottoman Empire.
16
 
The move towards reconstructing the Balkans around Slavic nation-states established two 
important precedents that would also be apparent in 1919–1920. The first was a trend away 
from multiethnic empires towards the nation-state model in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. 
The second was the imposition of clauses that protected minority rights within the treaties 
that established successor states to the retreating Ottoman Empire.
17
 Their adoption became a 
condition for international recognition and a means by which the internal governance of these 
states could be supervised by the Great Powers. The minority treaties signed after the First 
World War were also shaped by the principle of international oversight, however, the 
responsibility to guarantee minority rights would now be exercised by the League Council to 
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‘ascertain that the provisions for the protection of minorities are always observed’.18 It can be 
argued, as has been done by Carole Fink, that some of the key principles guiding the 
protection of minority rights in the interwar era were derived from the Berlin Conference of 
1878.
19
 
 
    There were, however, some important innovations made under the interwar regime that 
differed from the precedents established in 1878 surrounding the legal procedure for the 
enforcement of minority rights. Throughout the first decade of the League’s existence, the 
mechanisms for the resolution of minority questions were improved and enhanced, and it is 
worthwhile outlining this process in some detail. The provision for minority rights was first 
established in the Polish Treaty, signed on 28 June 1919, which formed the basis for 
successive minority treaties with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece.
20
 These treaties 
were a ‘tripartite agreement’ between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the state 
concerned, and the League of Nations. They did not constitute a universal framework for 
minority rights for two principal reasons. Firstly, the minority treaties were only applied to a 
handful of national governments that included: the defeated Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Turkey; the emergent states of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; and states already 
bound by minority clauses, such as Romania and Greece. These treaties were strengthened at 
the Paris Peace Conference in response to territorial adjustments.
21
 Secondly, the provisions 
of the minority treaties were to be upheld in the national laws of these individual states. For 
this reason, they did not establish in international law a basis for minority rights. The 
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protection of minority rights within national law was outlined in the first article of the 
Czechoslovak Treaty, which stated that the minority provisions ‘contained in Articles 2 to 8 
shall be recognised as fundamental laws and that no law, regulation or official action shall 
conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action 
prevail over them’.22 The nature of the rights to which minorities were entitled was 
elaborated in Article 8. It identified both individual and collective rights, asserting that:  
 
Czecho-Slovak nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic 
minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact 
as other Czecho-slovak nationals. In particular they shall have an equal 
right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, 
religious and social institutions, schools and other educational 
establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise 
their religion freely therein.
23
 
 
    The limited application of minority rights weakened the League’s scheme from the outset, 
and throughout the interwar years there were many efforts directed towards improving the 
scheme and making it more universal.
24
 The association of the minority treaties with the 
defeated nations and historic notions of Western tutelage caused much resentment in Poland 
and Czechoslovakia. Both of these nations saw themselves as partners in the Allied cause, 
and Czechoslovakia styled itself as a nation that was culturally part of Western Europe. As 
Beneš declared to the Council of Ten at Versailles, ‘the [Czech] Nation felt itself to be a 
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European Nation and a member of the Society of the Western States’.25 Furthermore, the 
exemption of the Great Powers and their colonial empires, particularly Italy given its 
jurisdiction over non-Italian communities in South Tyrol and Fiume, led to the impression 
that the treaties were unequal and unjust.
26
 
 
THE POLITICS OF MINORITY RIGHTS 
 
    The recognition of national minorities created as many conundrums as they resolved, and 
throughout the interwar period the disapproval of the Polish and Czechoslovak governments 
to the discussion of their internal affairs at Geneva was palpable. They primarily objected to 
the right of minority organisations to petition the League Council to notify its members of 
possible infractions of the minority treaties.
27
 The provision for international oversight had 
been established in Article 12 of the Polish Treaty and Article 14 of the Czechoslovak Treaty, 
which stated that minorities ‘[constituted] objects of international concern’ and placed them 
under the guarantee of the League of Nations.
28
 It is important to note that both articles gave 
neither minorities nor minority organisations the right to bring cases of infraction before the 
Council, but rather placed this responsibility on Members of the Council.
29
 Minority 
organisations, however, were able to lodge petitions to the Minorities Section of the 
Secretariat that, if deemed legitimate, would be sent to the government of the state concerned 
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for a written response.
30
 A ‘Committee of Three’ would then convene to consider both 
sources of information, and decide whether Members of the Council should be notified of a 
possible infraction of the minority treaties. The Council could then resolve the issue through 
its own mechanisms, or refer the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) for a final settlement.
31
 There was, however, no legal obligation for members to act 
upon the information presented to them by the minorities committee. This precedent was 
formalised in the Tittoni Resolution of October 1920, which affirmed that petitions did not 
constitute a legal document and, therefore, did not ‘create a new legal situation’.32  
 
    Nonetheless, the legal nature of minority petitions remained a contentious issue in Geneva 
throughout the 1920s. The debate centred upon whether petitions were legally binding, and 
by implication, whether minorities were a legal personality beyond national jurisdiction, or if 
petitions were merely of an informational nature that could be freely heeded or disregarded 
by Members of the Council.
33
 The representatives of states bound by the minority treaties 
adopted the latter view, fearing encroachment on their sovereignty by minority groups and 
the international scrutiny of the League in their internal affairs. This view was expressed in 
the Polish memorandum of 16 January 1923, which asserted that the process of lodging 
petitions was ‘devoid of legal foundation’ and ‘contrary to the stipulations of the [Polish] 
Minorities Treaty’.34 The memorandum was a product of Warsaw’s indignation over petitions 
submitted in 1920 by its Ukrainian minority during negotiations with Soviet Russia settling 
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Poland’s eastern border.35 Hence, it is not surprising that Poland affirmed the protection of 
the ‘freedom and equality’ of minorities only ‘within the limits of the states to which they 
belong’.36 According to the government in Warsaw, minority problems were temporary in 
nature and would be resolved by the reconciliation of minorities to the new political realities 
of the 1920s, rather than through external intervention and granting minorities a ‘privileged 
position’ both domestically and internationally.37 The memorandum, therefore, revealed 
tensions between the political orthodoxy of state sovereignty and the more recent treatment of 
minorities by the League as non-state entities. Beneš conferred with the opinions expressed 
by the Polish memorandum in his address to the League Assembly in September 1925, 
stating that any attempt to establish legal competence in minority questions beyond Members 
of the Council was not in accord with the provisions of the minority treaties.
38
 This reasoning 
lay behind his resistance to discuss the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia with the German 
foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, at Locarno in October of the same year.
39
 
 
    Beneš’ advocacy of a ‘minimalist’ approach to minority rights was influenced by the many 
interwar disputes that occurred between states over the sovereignty of contested territories. 
Invariably, these disputes were couched in terms of the nationality of the inhabitants in the 
contested region, and those states that wished to alter the status quo could either demand 
plebiscites in the spirit of national self-determination or attempt to gain extra-territorial 
influence through the mechanisms of the League.
40
 This was a particularly dire threat to a 
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multi-national state, such as Czechoslovakia, that could count on each of its neighbouring 
countries having their own territorial designs on its sovereign territory. During the ‘active’ 
life of the League between 1920 and 1935, the list of such disputes that involved minority 
questions was extensive. The clashes between Poland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands 
(1921), Poland and Germany in Upper Silesia (1921), Poland and Lithuania over Memel 
(1923) and Vilna (1927), Greece and Turkey over the expulsion of Greeks from 
Constantinople (1924–1926), Greece and Albania over the transfer of Albanians to Turkey 
(1924), and Britain and Turkey over Mosul (1920–1928) demonstrated how grievances over 
the treatment of minorities could quickly impair relations between states, or more alarmingly, 
how minorities could be used as pawns in the conduct of international relations.
41
 Thus, in the 
resolution of such disputes the first priority of the League was to separate the potential for 
state conflict – which was dealt with under Articles 11 to 15 of the Covenant – from minority 
questions, which were dealt with under the provisions of the relevant minorities treaty.
42
 
 
    On other occasions, a lack of common agreement on minority issues came down to 
fundamental disagreements over the purpose of the minority treaties. Whereas the minorities 
themselves and their advocates at the League saw minority rights as a means to protect 
cultural autonomy, the states bound to protect these rights initially saw them as a means to 
facilitate cultural assimilation by providing equal opportunity regardless of language, race 
and creed. These contrasting views were palpable in a dispute between German and Poland 
over questions raised in petitions lodged by the Deutscher Volksbund concerning German 
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minority schools in Polish Silesia.
43
 At the 53
rd
 Session of the Council in December 1928 
when this issue was discussed, a heated debate ensued between the German foreign minister, 
Gustav Stresemann, and his Polish counterpart, August Zaleski, that revealed the 
shortcomings of the minority treaties respective to the national interests of the states these 
ministers represented.
44
 The German-Polish Convention of 1922, which augmented the 
existing minority treaty with Poland, mandated that the declaration of language by children of 
school-age would determine the number of minority schools.
45
 Zaleski claimed that due to 
‘false declarations of language’ a significant proportion of students at minority schools were 
unable to follow German instruction because they did not have a sufficient understanding of 
the German language.
46
 Language was, of course, fundamental to the maintenance of German 
culture among minority communities and, from the perspective of the Polish Government, 
this impeded the process of cultural assimilation of the German minority. For Stresemann, the 
threat of the mass removal of students from minority schools posed a vital threat to the 
cultural autonomy of the German minority in Poland. He argued that the Polish position, 
which forced parents to nominate their child’s language as either German or Polish, did not 
grasp the complexity of Eastern Europe’s intermingled ethnic landscape in which many 
communities were bilingual or spoke regional dialects. 
 
   The dissention between Stresemann and Zaleski demonstrated how minority politics 
continued to poison international relations despite efforts to provide international oversight 
and arbitration. As well intentioned as Stresemann’s minority policy seemed, the posture of 
Weimar Germany as the champion of minorities was in part self-serving, since the 
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mechanism of the League enabled the German government to claim that it continued to 
represent the interests of German nationals who lived beyond the borders of the Reich.
47
 
Indeed, the opprobrium Stresemann directed towards Poland over its ‘spirit of hatred’ 
towards its German minority was foreboding of the rhetoric to be employed in Nazi 
propaganda during the crises of the 1930s with Poland and Czechoslovakia.
48
 
 
    The international guarantee of minority rights was, therefore, already starting to be 
discredited in its inaugural decade due to manipulation of the system by national 
governments in pursuit of irredentist goals. Under Stresemann, Germany provided financial 
subsidies to the Auslandsdeutschen, the influential journal on minorities, Nation und Staat, 
which came under the direct control of the German Foreign Ministry in 1927, and supported 
the goals European Minorities Congress – an organisation that would later become infamous 
for its connections with Nazi Germany.
49
 In the 1930s such behaviour would turn into 
outright abuse with Nazi Germany’s withdrawal from the League in 1933 and its pursuit of 
Heim ins Reich through military conquest – a policy to bring all German minorities living 
abroad into the German nation.
50
 Similarly, the termination of the League’s oversight of 
Poland’s minorities in 1935 was a further indication that the minority rights regime was 
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unravelling under the pressure of nationalist ideologies. In Prague, Beneš continued to 
publicly affirm his support of the League and minority rights, however, the events of 1937–
1938 that brought about the end of his presidency would ultimately prove too much for any 
residual commitments to such declarations after the Second World War.
51
 
 
‘NEW SWITZERLAND’ OR NATION-STATE? 
 
    The minority treaties were instituted as a compromise measure in response to the political 
reorganisation of Europe in 1919 around the largely unfulfilled promise of national self-
determination. The Czechoslovak Republic epitomized the failure to enact Wilson’s ideal, 
and in this regard the new state represented little improvement over the multiethnic empire of 
Austria-Hungary that it replaced. The discrepancy between the ideal of national self-
determination proclaimed at Paris and the political framework that emerged in East-Central 
Europe leaving millions of people without a national homeland or living beyond its borders 
lay at the heart of the domestic struggle between Prague the Sudeten Germans. Although 
Germans constituted the second largest nationality after Czechs, numbering more than three 
million, they were neither asked to express their wishes in a plebiscite nor granted political 
representation at the National Assembly that negotiated the peace settlement with the Allies 
and crafted the new state’s constitution.52 Throughout the life of the First Republic, the 
Germans of Czechoslovakia were excluded from the upper echelons of government and 
generally occupied a secondary position in national life. This harsh reality stood in stark 
contrast to the pronouncements that Beneš made to Western politicians and bureaucrats in 
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1919, proclaiming that the new republic would be a ‘little Switzerland’ of national cantons.53 
The contradiction between the romantic and humane vision of Czechoslovakia espoused at 
Paris and the actual Czechoslovak nation-state that emerged understandably earned Prague 
the antipathy its Sudeten German subjects. 
 
   From the outset of his diplomatic service in 1915, Beneš had sought to obtain the 
favourable opinion of the Allied Powers towards the creation of an independent Czech state. 
In both Paris and Geneva he actively cultivated the image of a statesman of Western pedigree 
that Britain and France could trust to represent their interests in East-Central Europe. For this 
reason, Beneš tended to play a cautious role when it came to minority questions. To both 
protect his position at home and further his cherished dream of a Czech state at the Paris 
Peace Conference, Beneš had to be seen by his Czech compatriots as a nationalist yet, at the 
same time, assuage British and French fears of Czech chauvinism. Beneš’ deft performance 
in balancing these two considerations at Versailles secured his reputation as a skilled 
diplomat and admired national leader.
54
 However, his reception was rather less generous 
among those who thought Czech claims were excessive or deceptively construed. Lloyd 
George, infamous for his capacity for invective, privately referred to Beneš as ‘the little 
French jackal’ whose statements ‘reeked with professions of sympathy for the exalted ideals 
proclaimed by the Allies in their crusade for international right’.55 A more reserved yet 
equally revealing critique of Beneš was made by Archibald Coolidge, an American academic 
who conducted a commission into the political conditions of former Austria-.Hungary. 
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Map 1.1. Ethnographic Map of Czechoslovakia Showing Minorities 
BNA, FO 925/2118 (with permission) 
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Map 1.2. Ethnographic Map of Czechoslovakia Showing Density of the German Minority 
BNA, FO 925/2118 (with permission) 
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In response to the Czech’s territorial demands, he remarked: 
 
In Bohemia they demand ‘historic frontiers’ regardless of the protests of 
large numbers of Germans who do not wish to be taken over in this way. 
In Slovakia they insist on the rights of nationality and pay no heed to the 
ancient and well marked ‘historic frontiers’ of Hungary.79 
 
    This double-standard on the question of nationality was a conspicuous thread that ran 
through Czechoslovakia’s case for independence when it was presented to the Allied 
Supreme Council on 5 February 1919.
80
 Beneš, in his new capacity as foreign minister, and 
Karel Kramář, as prime minister, were charged with the crucial task of convincing Lloyd 
George, Clemenceau and Wilson to grant the Czechs the Hapsburg territories of Bohemia, 
Moravia, Austrian Silesia and Slovakia, or as Beneš had declared with great hubris in 
October 1918,  the ‘frontiers they should like to have’.81 The justification for the inclusion of 
these territories into a Czechoslovak state was based on historical precedent, economic and 
strategic necessities, and the principle of national self-determination.
82
 On the issue of the 
Bohemian (Sudeten) Germans, Beneš on the one hand declared they would be accorded ‘full 
minority rights’, yet on the other, argued that they should not be granted a plebiscite because 
they would vote for exclusion from the Czechoslovak state.
83
 His reluctance to extend 
national rights to the German minority was a manifest contradiction of the principles upon 
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which the Czechs claimed their own right to independence. Moreover, Beneš’ expression of 
deep-seated Germanophobia in his declaration that the Czechs would act as ‘the protectors of 
democracy against Germanism’ and fulfil their ‘duty at all times to fight the Germans’ should 
have raised serious doubts about granting Prague jurisdiction over three million Germans.
84
  
 
    While French support for the excessive territorial claims made by the Czech delegation 
could be assumed given the strategic need to contain Germany, Anglo-American support was 
by no means an historical certainty. The Czech delegation was fortunate in that the so-called 
‘New Europe’ group came to occupy key positions in the British Foreign Office as the First 
World War drew to a close.
85
 These influential advocates of an independent Czechoslovakia 
included the historian Robert Seton-Watson and foreign correspondent for The Times, 
Wickham Steed, who became key advisors on the Hapsburg Empire.
86
 Both had extensive 
contacts with anti-Hapsburg émigré communities and were close friends of both Masaryk and 
Beneš. They propagated a romantic view of the Czechs as a people of democratic and liberal 
traditions that were exceptional among the Slavs for their rationalism, efficiency and 
tolerance.
87
  
 
    Such racial propaganda, however, did not entirely render voices of criticism to the 
bureaucratic margins. Cecil Gosling, Britain’s Charge d’Affaires in Prague in 1919, wrote to 
London of his ‘a deep pessimism about the internal and racial condition of the 
[Czechoslovak] republic’ and serious doubts about ‘its capacity to survive’.88 Gosling even 
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recommended that British troops should be sent to the Sudeten territories to prevent tensions 
escalating into civil unrest.
89
 In response to these dismal warnings Seton-Watson was 
dispatched to Prague, arriving in May 1919, to investigate the condition of Czechoslovak 
internal relations.
90
 He wrote back to the Foreign Office expressing confidence in Masaryk’s 
capacity as president and dismissed the seriousness of Czech-German hostilities.
91
 Seton-
Watson’s report allayed the fears of the Foreign Office and allowed Britain, with clear 
conscience, to give Prague continued diplomatic support well into the 1920s. This was 
evident in Britain’s decision to prevent Sudeten German petitions on land reform coming 
before the League Council on numerous occasions and the Foreign Office’s general view that 
the long-term resolution of minority questions would be achieved through national 
assimilation.
92
  
 
    The inconsistencies in Beneš’ case and the potential for Czechoslovakia’s multiethnic 
character to cause internal instability were thus known, yet not adequately heeded at the time 
by the Allied Powers. Beneš and Kramář were either given the benefit of the doubt or were 
protected by the widespread anti-German sentiment that prevailed in the wake of the 
Armistice. More importantly, they presented Britain and France with a fait accompli by 
creating facts on the ground that gave legitimacy to their excessive territorial claims. The 
Czechoslovaks had been the first of the new states to be recognised by the Allied Powers and, 
upon assuming control in Prague in October 1918, the National Assembly claimed authority 
over the German inhabitants of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia. This declaration 
went against the wishes of the German members of the Reichsrat (Austrian Parliament), who 
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passed a resolution that all German settlements were part of Austria.
93
 The authority of the 
Reichstrat over these areas, however, was extremely limited given the decision of the 
National Assembly to send Czech militia units to occupy the Bohemian hinterland and 
western Slovakia in order to consolidate its control over these areas.
94
 In Bohemia, the Czech 
occupation provoked widespread resistance in German areas that lasted until the 
Czechoslovak delegation concluded negotiations with the Allies in September 1919.
95
 The 
bloodiest confrontation occurred on 3/4 March 1919, resulting in the death of fifty-four 
German civilians and eighty-four wounded.
96
 Otto Bauer, the Austrian foreign minister, 
directly protested to the Allies against the inclusion of the German populated borderland and 
asked for plebiscite, which was duly rejected.
97
 Similarly, the military occupation of Slovakia 
led to clashes with Hungarian forces throughout November 1918, and an outright retreat of 
Czech forces behind the Moravian-Slovak border was only prevented by French diplomatic 
intervention.
98
 The non-Czech territories awarded to Prague were thus obtained by military 
occupation and bloodshed that had the imprimatur of France, and to a lesser extent, Britain. 
The way in which these lands were conquered would have dire ramifications for the viability 
of Czechoslovakia once the key foundations of the state were undermined in the 1930s. 
 
    Beneš’ lack of empathy towards the Bohemian Germans was by no means isolated. Indeed, 
Czech chauvinism was far from lacking among the Czech émigrés during the First World 
War. Behind Masaryk’s liberal program of democracy, the rule of law and Rights of Man that 
he professed in Britain and America was an avowed Czech nationalism: ‘our politics must be 
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above all Czech ... and thus also Slav’.99 In later personal correspondence with the National 
Democrat Viktor Dyk, Masaryk wrote, ‘That we must lead the Germans is a matter of 
course... Who, please, is for a non-national state?’100 Thus, having abandoned any pretentions 
of supporting Hapsburg federalism, the Czech émigrés had become passionate advocates of a 
Czech nation-state that would civilize any German, Magyar or Slav minorities that came 
under its jurisdiction. This nationalist sentiment was reflected in the organisation of the 
Czech independence movement and the early republic. Out of 256 seats on the self-appointed 
National Assembly in November 1918, fifty-five were given to the Slovaks and none to the 
German, Hungarian, Polish or Ruthenian minorities.
101
 The marginalisation of these ethnic 
groups was also a product of the political ideology around which the state was formed. In his 
interwar memoirs, Beneš expressed his deep Francophile sensibilities and stressed the 
importance of the French Revolution on his political development. While the French 
revolutionary tradition did pass down, in Beneš’ words, the ‘traditional humanitarian, 
universal, and cosmopolitan tendency, which sought the genuine cult of humanity’, it also 
bequeathed the concept of a powerful central government that was not conceptually in accord 
with a Swiss model of national-linguistic autonomy.
102
 Indeed, the national cult built around 
the Czech democratic tradition and the Masaryk presidency were prime examples of 
conscious initiatives to construct Czechoslovakia around ‘an imagined political community’ 
that was fundamentally Czech.
103
 The First Republic was thus less cosmopolitan and less 
democratic than its nationalist myth purported. 
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ENEMY WITHIN, ENEMY WITHOUT: CZECHOSLOVAKIA UNRAVELS, 1937–
1938  
 
   The recognition of minority rights in peace treaties of 1919-1920 greatly increased the 
influence and agency of minorities in both international and domestic politics. For most of 
the interwar period, however, the plight of the German minority in Czechoslovakia was not a 
matter of great concern either at the League or in Prague. In large measure, this was due to 
the fact that the Sudeten Germans were not subjected to the abuses and excesses committed 
against minorities by state authorities elsewhere in Europe. Nonetheless, from the perspective 
of the Sudeten Germans, systemic discrimination was perpetrated against their community by 
Czech authorities, which constituted legitimate grievances and created grounds for feelings of 
resentment towards the Czechoslovak state. The exclusion of German political parties from 
government until 1926, Prague’s pursuit of ‘anti-German’ land reforms and the 1920 
language law that made ‘Czechoslovak’ the national language constituted the principal 
grievances before the onset of the Great Depression.
104
 The economic malaise of the 1930s 
that resulted in mass unemployment and social dislocation was acutely felt in Sudeten 
German areas and contributed to the rise of Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Party (SdP) 
that caused considerable political instability from 1935.  
 
    Henlein’s movement drew on the hostile passions aroused by past and present injustices 
among the Sudeten German community and, prior to the involvement of the Third Reich, it 
demanded significant internal political reform that would have fundamentally transformed 
the national character of Czechoslovakia. The intransigence of Beneš, who had succeeded 
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Masaryk as president in 1935, and his fellow Czech nationalists led to the fateful involvement 
of Nazi Germany in what had been a domestic political crisis. In this sense, the politics of 
interwar Czechoslovakia conformed to the general European trend towards political and 
national extremism that brought long simmering prejudices and hatred to the fore. It is 
therefore worth examining the grievances of the Sudeten German minority in the early years 
of the republic, as these set the tone of Czech-German relations prior to the irreparable 
damage which occurred at Munich.  
 
    The large-scale expropriation and redistribution of rural land in the first decade of the 
republic created a lasting distrust and hostility among the Sudeten German minority for the 
Czechoslovak state. They perceived land reform as a means by which Prague could carry out 
its policy of ‘Czechification’ by settling Czech ‘colonists’ in predominantly German areas.105 
In contrast, the redistribution or nationalisation of some four million hectares of arable and 
non-arable land was proclaimed by Czech politicians as a shining example of the republic’s 
capacity to implement social justice on a grand scale. Indeed, Masaryk had triumphantly 
referred to the land reforms as the ‘crowning act’ of the Czechoslovak national revolution.106 
Mark Cornwall has assessed in great detail the controversy over land reform in 
Czechoslovakia. He concludes that the veracity of the conflicting claims made by Czechs and 
Germans depends as much on one’s perspective as their veracity when compared with official 
statistics of land expropriation and redistribution. 
 
    The assertion that land expropriation had a disproportionate effect on German landholders 
is supported to some extent by the statistics of the Czech Land Office. By 1931, when the 
majority of expropriated land had been reallocated, Germans had received a mere 28 per cent 
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of distributed land in Bohemia’s ‘mixed regions’ – a bureaucratic euphemism used to 
describe areas with a significant or majority German population.
107
 They did, however, 
receive 58 per cent of smallholdings and former German aristocrats were in many cases 
permitted to retain a large portion of their estates.
108
 What was particularly ominous to the 
Sudeten Germans was the resettlement of Czech legionnaires in the Bohemian hinterland that 
threatened to alter the fragile Czech-German demographic balance. This program was jointly 
supported by the ministries of Agriculture and Defence and was aided by the creation of a 
‘colonization fund’ during Beneš’ term as prime minister (1921–1922).109 In what was to 
prove one of the more remarkable repetitions of history, the interwar model of land reform, 
which had facilitated the extension of the Czech linguistic border, was revisited in 1945 as 
part of Beneš’ postwar policy to consolidate Czech control of the Sudetenland. However, 
under the ‘Beneš Decrees’ – a form of emergency powers exercised by President Beneš 
between 1940 and 1945 – the process was undertaken in a far more brutal manner. Upon 
liberation, all the property of German inhabitants was expropriated and then redistributed to 
loyal Czech and Slovak citizens.
110
 Like the interwar example, a national fund was 
established to provide assistance for resettlement. 
 
    The question of land reform was linked from the outset to Czechoslovakia’s development 
as a nation-state. In the First Republic, grievances over dispossession and Czech 
encroachment were seen through the prism of minority rights and petitions on the matter 
were summarily lodged by German organisations to the League of Nations. Czech-German 
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nationalists and the German Parliamentary Union had submitted petitions to the Minorities 
Section in 1921, 1922 and 1924, however, were unable to provide evidence of systemic 
discrimination against Germans.
111
 When Erik Colban, the director of the Minorities Section, 
appointed a Committee of Three in 1922 to investigate claims made in a petition submitted 
by Wilhelm von Medinger, both Colban and the British representative, Sir Cecil Hurst, 
contacted Beneš directly.112 They accepted his explanation, without thorough investigation, 
that the land reforms had been applied equally to all nationalities and that any apparent 
discrimination was due to the fact that Germans had been the majority landholders under the 
Hapsburgs.
113
 Furthermore, Beneš disclaimed any responsibility for colonisation programs, 
and attributed them to the activities of legionnaire organisations. The dismissal of petitions 
on land reform was emblematic of the failure of the internal processes of the League and the 
unwillingness of its members to enforce minority rights. Abandoned by their guarantors, the 
Sudeten Germans would turn to more radical means to address their grievances. 
 
    By the 1930s, this was manifest in Czechoslovakia’s polarized political environment. Up 
until this point, Czechoslovakia had been notable for its democracy and political stability as 
its neighbours drifted towards authoritarianism. Its governing coalition could rely upon a 
broad base of support that included a number of moderate German parties, which served in 
government from 1926 onwards.
114
 To some extent, this political settlement continued into 
the mid-1930s due to the immense personal appeal of Masaryk. Yet the broad-base of support 
for Masaryk only concealed underlying political fragmentation, which was revealed by 
Beneš’ fraught succession to the presidency.115  In contrast to Masaryk’s overwhelming re-
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election in 1934, Beneš succeeded him with difficulty in 1935, and only by securing the 
support of German Agrarians, the National Union, and Fascists.
116
 The most fundamental 
political change, however, came with the rise of Konrad Heinlein’s SdP. The party had been 
formed in 1933 as the Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront (SHF) but was renamed prior to the 1935 
parliamentary elections in order avoid being banned from campaigning.
117
 Its success in these 
elections, in which the SdP obtained two-thirds of the German vote and emerged as the single 
largest party, introduced a new and more hostile political agent into Czechoslovakia’s 
democracy.
118
 Its links with the Nazi Party (NSDAP) were particularly threatening, given 
Hitler’s goal of Anschluss, and led to the somewhat inaccurate accusation that the SdP was a 
vehicle for German irredentism. 
 
   Like its German counterpart, the economic depression allowed the SdP to convert the 
memory of past grievances into political capital.
119
 In addition to the party’s cry that the 
Sudeten Germans had lost ‘600,000 hectares of their national soil’ through Prague’s land 
reforms, Henlein could also point to disproportionate levels of suffering in German industrial 
areas.
120
 These export-orientated industries were particularly vulnerable to global economic 
conditions, and in the early 1930s the level of unemployment in the German borderlands was 
double that of the Czech interior.
121
 Moreover, the situation was not helped by reports that the 
high level of German unemployment was also due to the replacement of German workers 
with Czech labour, and the awarding of government contracts to Czech firms in German 
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areas as a form of industrial welfare.
122
 Indeed, the National Defence Law of 1936 granted 
the government extensive control over industry and permitted the dismissal of all persons 
deemed ‘unreliable in the eyes of the state’.123 
 
    Henlein’s solution to the plight of the Sudeten Germans was not initially separation from 
Czechoslovakia and union with the Third Reich. The party had begun as a ‘broad church’ that 
incorporated a ‘range of political outlooks’ that had not yet become an agent of Nazism.124 In 
the mid-1930s, Henlein’s approach was rather one of internal political reform that would 
fundamentally alter the national character of the Czechoslovak state and, in many regards, it 
took the ideas contained within the minority treaties to their next logical step. The party’s 
main policies were best summarised by the eight-point Karlsbad Program, announced on 24 
April 1938, that included provisions for German self-government in German districts and the 
recognition of the German minority as a legal personality.
125
  
 
    The SdP, however, had long articulated the need for radical political reform since 
becoming a parliamentary force. In April 1937, SdP representatives had introduced a series of 
bills that would have made it a requirement for all Czechoslovak citizens to register as a 
member of a national organisation, each of which would constitute a legal personality and 
have a right of appeal to a Verfassungsgericht (Special Court of Appeal).
126
 Compensation 
for the infraction of minority rights would also be guaranteed and penalties would apply in 
cases where an individual was forced to use a language other than their own. Each of these 
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initiatives sought to rectify the injustices faced by the Sudeten German minority by reforming 
the state rather than seeking its destruction. As Henlein stated to Prime Minister Milan Hodža 
in a private meeting on 16 September 1937: 
 
 I could equally have denied the constitution, as the Sudeten German 
Party had no hand in voting for it in 1920; I could have demanded the 
right of self-determination. I did not do so, but accepted the State and the 
constitution as established facts. The bills do not alter the constitution, 
but represent a supplement thereto; they were already to some extent 
promised in the constitution only they have hitherto not been enacted.
127
 
 
    The SdP program would have transformed Czechoslovakia into a federal multinational 
state, much like the ‘new Switzerland’ that Beneš had advocated in 1919. However, the 
attempt by the governing parties to marginalise the SdP only drove Henlein into closer 
association with Hitler and, in a vicious circle, increased the suspicions of Prague. As Hodža 
remarked to Henlein, the outcome of successful negotiations was dependent on the SdP 
avoiding being seen as ‘a branch of Hitlerism’.128 The Nazi Anschluss with Austria in March 
1938, however, ended any possibility of an internal settlement to the ongoing dispute 
between the SdP and the Czechoslovak Government. Without the means of resolving the 
crisis through the mechanisms of the League and also having lost their high standing in 
Britain and France, the Czechs were at the mercy of the sword. 
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Figure 1.2. Adolf Hitler and Konrad Henlein, 1938 (Courtesy of the 
Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin; F 66/127). 
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II 
FROM MUNICH TO POTSDAM 
  
THE PATH TO EXPULSION IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE 
~ 
 The problem of national minorities will have to be considered far more 
systematically and radically than it was after the last war. I accept the 
principle of the transfer of populations. 
─ Edvard Beneš1 
 
There will be no mixture of populations to cause endless trouble … A clean 
sweep will be made. I am not alarmed by the prospect of the 
disentanglement of populations, nor even by these large transferences, 
which are more possible in modern conditions than they ever were before. 
─ Winston Churchill2 
 
    On 1 October 1938, the Wehrmacht began its bloodless occupation of the Sudetenland in 
accord with the Munich Agreement.
3
 Four days later the President of Czechoslovakia, Edvard 
Beneš, resigned his post and departed the country.4 The Czechoslovak Republic then 
underwent further dismemberment at the hands of Poland and Hungary before the Slovaks 
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declared independence from Prague on 14 March 1939.
5
 On the following day, the remaining 
rump Czech state was annexed by the Third Reich as the Protectorate of Bohemia and 
Moravia.
6
 The destruction of Czechoslovakia has remained in historical consciousness as an 
unedifying symbol of the betrayal of Anglo-French appeasement and another fateful step on 
the road to the Second World War. For Beneš, the collapse of the First Republic from 
external aggression and internal subversion dealt a mortal blow to Czech independence – a 
dream for which he had strived and served for a quarter-century.  
     
    Beneš’ arrival in London on 22 October 1938 marked the beginning of a political exile that 
was to last until his triumphant return to Prague nearly seven years later on 16 May 1945.
7
 
During this period, Beneš established a London-based government-in-exile and pursued a 
relentless campaign to re-establish a Czechoslovak state in the heart of Europe.
8
 The mass 
expulsion of the Sudeten German population was a crucial component of this policy; for in 
Beneš view, the Czechs and Slovaks could only flourish as an independent people by ridding 
themselves of the traitorous German minority.
9
 This Carthaginian policy would form the 
basis of his crusade to once again obtain Czechoslovak independence within its ‘historic’ pre-
Munich borders. Once again, as in 1918–1919, Beneš had to convince the Great Powers to 
support his proposals to fundamentally reshape East-Central Europe. The main difference, 
however, between the first and second struggles for Czech independence was that Beneš 
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envisaged an ethnographic as well as a political revolution for Czechoslovakia’s second 
national awakening in the 1940s that would complete the process of nation-state formation.   
 
      Czechoslovakia’s second national revolution was thus built upon the principle of national 
homogeneity. The failure to attain cooperation among its national minorities in the interwar 
period meant that the exact restoration of the First Republic was neither advisable nor 
desirable in the mind of Beneš and his political allies.10 Their conclusion spelt the end of 
cosmopolitan democracy in East-Central Europe. Exactly how the antebellum situation would 
be rectified, however, was not immediately apparent and was debated throughout the war 
between the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, the British Foreign Office and Beneš’ fellow 
exiles, the Sudeten German Social Democrats led by Wenzel Jaksch. As a victim of Nazi 
aggression, it is tempting to conclude that it was only a matter of time before Beneš, as the 
representative of the Czechoslovak state, convinced the Allied Powers to support his policy 
to drastically reduce the size of the Sudeten German minority. The path to the postwar 
expulsions, however, was far more arduous than a retrospective cursory glance would 
suggest. Both the agreement to implement these expulsions and the nature of their execution 
was greatly owing to the considerable wartime efforts of Beneš and the radicalising effect of 
the Second World War. 
     
    The years between the Munich and Potsdam conferences marked the period in which 
proposals for the expulsion of Germans from Central and Eastern Europe were formulated 
and developed. Beneš played a crucial role in this process, both as the leader of a 
government-in-exile that had extensive grievances against a German minority and as a 
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leading proponent of population transfers to strengthen nation-states.
11
 There are two 
important questions concerning Beneš during this period: firstly, the origins and development 
of his plans to expel the Sudeten Germans; and secondly, the extent of his influence over 
Allied policy in East-Central Europe, which became increasingly favourable during the 
course of the war to the expulsion of troublesome minorities. Britain was the most important 
player, given that it alone of the Big Three was a signatory to the Munich Agreement. Beneš’ 
diplomatic manoeuvres in London, therefore, form a crucial chapter in the genesis of the 
expulsions. His final triumph came in August 1945 with the inclusion of Article 12 in the 
Potsdam Protocol, which outlined the ‘orderly and humane’ transfer of the German 
populations of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
12
  
 
POPULATION TRANSFERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 1919–1939 
 
    The conceptual framework behind the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia lies in 
the two decades that preceded the Munich Conference. The eviction of German nationals 
from lands beyond the German state as envisaged in the Potsdam Protocol drew on the 
precedents established by interwar and wartime population transfers and exchanges that were 
conducted in both the presence and absence of international oversight. These ‘experiments’ 
formed part of a concerted effort in the first-half of the twentieth century to align ethnic 
boundaries with state borders – a process that concurred alongside the emergence of Central 
and Eastern Europe from under the aegis of multiethnic empires and the region’s traumatic 
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reorganisation around the nation-state model. The project of creating a Czechoslovak nation-
state had only been partially fulfilled in 1918 through revolution and independence; the 
political conditions of the 1940s, however, made possible a second ‘national’ revolution 
whereby the multiethnic state could be rearranged to reflect its Slavic political character. The 
population transfers of the 1920s and 1930s formed the basis upon which this national project 
could be realised. 
 
    The expulsion of the Sudeten Germans thus fit into a pre-existing pattern of state-enforced 
population removals between 1919 and 1949 that sought to bring about the ‘ethnic unmixing’ 
of Europe.
13
 These so-called ‘population transfers’ were closely associated with the growth of 
nationalist ideology and the process of state formation in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. As 
outlined in the preceding chapter, these two factors greatly exacerbated tensions between the 
regions’ intermingled ethnic groups and undermined the civic and cultural rights of those 
minorities whose livelihood could not be guaranteed under national law. The realisation that 
the rights of minorities could not be protected by an international body, such as the League of 
Nations, or that such protection could undermine national sovereignty, resulted in a 
preference for the creation of greater national homogeneity. Population transfers and 
exchanges were increasingly promoted as the means by which this goal could be attained. 
This alternative allowed the establishment of a more stable political and social framework 
than that bequeathed by the Paris Peace Treaties and avoided extensive territorial revision or 
armed conflict. These early experiments in nation-state engineering would form the 
blueprints for the postwar expulsions that were to be executed on a much greater scale. 
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    The term ‘population transfer’ is somewhat misleading since its practice in the twentieth 
century has typically occurred under conditions of duress, compulsion and the threat of 
systematic discrimination against any persons who did not avail themselves of departure. It is 
therefore understandable that the term has become somewhat of an Orwellian euphemism for 
the assault by state authorities on undesirable ethnic groups.
14
 Certainly, the majority of state-
enforced migrations in the first half of the twentieth century are more accurately described by 
‘expulsion’, ‘genocide’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’ than the more benign term ‘population transfer’. 
This is primarily due to the arbitrary nature of state retribution carried out both during and in 
the wake of the two world wars that corresponded with the collapse of the old order in 
Europe.
15
 The first example of modern genocide in Armenia (1915–1916) introduced 
humanity to state violence on a hitherto unknown level.
16
 The infamous ‘death marches’ of 
women, children and the infirm into the Syrian Desert that resulted in as many as 1,300,000 
deaths was but the first step of the wider ethnic cleansing in Anatolia of its non-Turkish 
inhabitants; and this in turn foreshadowed the atrocities committed by the Nazis during the 
Second World War.
17
  
 
    The advent of total war and the increasingly powerful machinery of state apparatus meant 
that more systemic forms of national engineering could be achieved over shorter periods of 
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time to greater effect.
18
 Such practices were utilized in the name of nationalism and were 
practiced by both totalitarian states and liberal democracies. Indeed, the racial classification 
system used by France in Alsace-Lorraine to purge both provinces of their German 
population between 1918 and 1921 was an early example of de-nationalisation followed by 
expulsion.
19
 This model would form the basis for the mass displacement of persons in Nazi 
and Soviet-occupied Europe and the postwar expulsion of the Germans carried out by the 
Allied Powers and their wartime partners in Prague and Warsaw.
20
 Population transfers were 
thus part of a broader movement of state violence employed for nationalist objectives.  
 
    Amid these brutal and violent displacements, however, was a narrow window during the 
mid 1920s when a concerted effort was made to enact controlled population resettlement 
under international auspices. The realisation that ethnic minorities could not be protected 
from hostile national governments despite the best efforts at international protection lent 
favour to the notion of internationally regulated population transfers that would prevent 
large-scale loss of life and bring about a more stable political and social framework by 
reducing inter-state and intra-state tensions.
21
 The first of such transfers occurred between 
Greece and Bulgaria under Article 45 of the Treaty of Neuilly, concluded on 27 November 
1919.
22
 A mixed commission under the League of Nations was appointed to oversee ‘the 
reciprocal and voluntary emigration of the racial, religious and linguistic’ minorities between 
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both states.
23
 Between 1924 and 1926 a total of 101,800 Bulgarians and 52,891 Greeks 
emigrated and property compensation was completed by 1931.
24
  
 
    This example was closely followed by the more historically significant population 
exchange between Greece and Turkey under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).
25
 Under this 
agreement, the Orthodox and Muslim minorities of both states were transferred under 
international guarantee.
26
 Yet at the time the treaty was signed, much of what it envisaged 
had already been achieved in regards to the Greek population, which had either been 
massacred in the ethnic cleansing of Anatolia or fled as refugees across the Aegean after the 
sacking of Smyrna in September 1922. Of the 1,268,000 refugees that made their way to 
Greece between 1922 and 1933, only 150,000 were transferred in an orderly manner.
27
 The 
plight of the Orthodox Greeks was in stark contrast to the more orderly emigration of nearly 
half a million Muslim Turks after 1923 under the supervision of the Mixed Commission.
28
 
The resettlement of the Greek minority, however, was somewhat more successful. 
Responsibility for the resettlement program was given to a commission appointed by the 
League and it was funded by a generous Anglo-American loan. The immigrants proved to be 
an important source of skilled labour and contributed to the much needed urban development 
and agricultural growth in a nation that was still reeling from nearly a decade of constant 
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warfare.
29
 Moreover, the influx of Greek refugees into areas recently vacated by their Muslim 
and Bulgarian inhabitants achieved the desired Hellenisation of Macedonia and Thrace, and 
thus, further consolidated the nation-state model in the Balkans.
30
 
 
    For these reasons, the Greco-Turkish population exchange was generally referred to in 
glowing terms and seen as a model to be emulated elsewhere in the troubled European 
continent. The observation of the English historian John Stephens that the exchange had 
‘worked wonders’ and must be applied as an immediate solution to minorities ‘whose 
sufferings under alien rule excite their brothers to a warlike fury’ was characteristic of 
confidence held in the potential for population transfers to resolve the tension between 
nationalism and minority rights.
31
 More importantly, the Greco-Turkish model continued to 
be lauded by none other than Winston Churchill as a prime example of the ‘disentanglement 
of populations’ in the closing years of the Second World War.32 However, the relative 
successes of the Greco-Bulgarian and Greco-Turkish exchanges were to prove exceptions to 
the rule and any benefits resulting from their implementation must be balanced against the 
uprooting of historic communities, immense bloodshed and suffering, and considerable 
financial expense.
33
 It is also important to realise that in comparison with the postwar 
expulsion of Germans, these exchanges were on a much smaller scale and occurred over a 
more extensive period of time. 
 
    There were two further instances of population transfer that had considerable influence on 
the formulation of the postwar expulsion of the Germans, although these were not conducted 
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under the League of Nations. They include the eviction of German-speakers from South 
Tyrol (1939) and the population transfer of Baltic and Bessarabia Germans that took place 
under the Nazi-Soviet Pact (1939–1941).34 A proposal was also mooted by Sir Nevile 
Henderson, the British Ambassador to Germany, in the days leading up to the outbreak of the 
Second World War for an exchange of populations between Germany and Poland.
35
 Unlike 
the earlier population exchanges in the Balkans, these agreements were not reflective of 
expedient measures reached in the aftermath of armed conflict; rather, they had been reached 
by bilateral negotiations between ‘friendly’ nationalist states. Although the numbers involved 
in these transfers were dwarfed by wartime cases of ethnic cleansing, population 
displacement and the postwar expulsion of the German populations, they were nonetheless 
important examples of state-organised ethnic reorganisation to consolidate a new racial order 
in Europe. 
 
    The arrangement between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to transfer the German-speakers 
of South Tyrol was reached in a preliminary agreement signed in Berlin on 23 July 1939, and 
a final agreement was signed in Rome on 21 October 1939.
36
 This German minority had 
displayed limited potential for assimilation since the inclusion of South Tyrol in the Italian 
state in 1919, and their transfer into the German Reich offered the prospect of dissolving 
potential disputes between the Axis Powers over the issue of ethnic minorities. A notable 
feature that this agreement shared with past and future population transfers was the 
introduction of ethnicity alongside citizenship as a legal category. Both ethnicity and forms 
of citizenship determined the treatment of German-speakers under the South Tyrol transfer. 
This was apparent in the distinction drawn between the Reichsdeutsche – former Austrian 
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nationals that had not accepted Italian citizenship in 1919 – and Italian citizens of German 
ethnicity.
37
 The former group was not given the option of remaining in Italy, and their 
evacuation was put under the control of Heinrich Himmler and the SS.
38
 Conversely, the 
latter were able to opt for resettlement under a plebiscite that lasted until 31 December 1939, 
with a three year extension for the settlement of property.
39
 Any German-speakers that chose 
to remain were faced with the prospect of national assimilation. In effect, this meant that 
German-speakers in South Tyrol renounced their cultural rights in Italy, either by migrating 
to the Reich or by becoming Italian. Despite the looming threat of total assimilation to induce 
their departure, approximately 100,000 Germans chose to remain in South Tyrol.
40
 As a 1942 
British study into population transfers correctly observed, ‘voluntary’ transfers did not 
produce a ‘clean frontier’ because there was no assurance of the complete removal of the 
minority in question.
41
 If such a result was desired, the only option was to carry out a 
compulsory transfer. 
 
BEGINNINGS: THE NEČAS MISSION  
 
     Edvard Beneš was an early convert to the idea of population transfers and first considered 
their application in Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1938 during the height of the Munich 
Crisis. This significantly predates his first major public declaration in September 1941 of 
support for the principle of population transfers in his oft-cited article, ‘The New Order in 
Europe’.42 Although the idea of undertaking population transfers in the Czech lands had first 
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been raised by the French sociologist Bernard Lavergne after the First World War, the 
prospect of population transfers ‘was rejected [at the time] as being apparently in 
contradiction to the idealistic tendencies governing the 1919 plans for a new Europe’.43 By 
1938, however, the Versailles settlement had become thoroughly discredited and the liberal 
principles espoused by the League of Nations ceased to carry much weight in the conduct of 
international affairs. The possibility of reorganising Europe along ethnic-national lines, as 
had been achieved in Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey through population transfers, was 
heralded as an alternative to territorial revision and the now moribund League’s defence of 
minority rights. This was the political context in which European statesmen, including Beneš, 
approached the Munich Conference.  
 
    It is often forgotten that a limited Czech-German population exchange was envisaged 
under the Munich Agreement. Provisions for a voluntary migration of Czech and German 
nationals were contained in Clause VII, which stated: 
 
There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred 
territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date 
of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall 
determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the 
transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of 
the said transfer.
44
 
 
Such a transfer would ostensibly prevent a new minority problem by removing the Czech 
minority from the Sudetenland and transferring Germans who lived outside the Sudetenland 
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into the ceded areas. An orderly process of population exchange did not, however, take place. 
Despite proposals to establish an international body to be ‘charged with the question of the 
possible exchange of populations on the basis of the right to opt within some specified time-
limit’, neither the organisation nor envisaged conditions of migration eventuated. Instead, the 
responsibility for population transfers was given to the German-Czechoslovak Commission, 
which had been formed at the behest of Hitler’s Godesburg Ultimatum in place of Neville 
Chamberlain’s preference for an international body.45 Free from international control, the 
commission denied right of Sudeten Germans to opt out of the Reich.
46
 This violation of the 
‘right of option’ principle that had been a feature of the interwar transfers resulted in the 
chaotic flight of 160,000 refugees of both Czech and German nationality from the Nazi-
occupation of the Sudetenland.
47
 
 
    A more systematic proposal for population transfer in the Sudetenland, however, was 
secretly proposed by President Beneš during the height of the Munich Crisis. On 16 
September 1938, Beneš entrusted Jaromír Nečas, Minister of Social Welfare, with the task of 
communicating a secret offer of territorial concessions over the Sudetenland to the French 
Government through Lèon Blum, the leader of the French Socialist Party.
48
 Blum passed on 
the terms of Beneš’ message to the French Prime Minister, Eduoard Daladier, before the 
latter’s crucial meeting with Neville Chamberlain and Viscount Halifax at the Anglo-French 
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Conference in London on 18 September.
49
 In return for the cession of four to six thousand 
square kilometres of territory beyond Czechoslovakia’s defensive fortifications (which was 
inhabited by half a million German-speakers) Beneš proposed that Hitler accept the transfer 
of an additional 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 Sudeten Germans into the Reich.
50
 The combined 
effect of the territorial cessation and population transfer would have reduced the German 
minority from approximately 3,200,000 to a mere 650,000 (Table 2.1).
51
 If this proposal had 
been enacted, Czechoslovakia would not only have become a more ethnically homogenous 
state, but would also have retained its extensive border defences that were surrendered under 
the Munich Agreement. As subsequent events would prove, the loss of these fortifications 
mortally impaired Czechoslovakia’s viability as an independent nation. In contrast to the 
proposal extended by Beneš to the Allies in mid-September, the Munich Agreement which 
was concluded a mere two weeks later, deprived Czechoslovakia of 27,000 square kilometres 
of land by forcing the state to cede areas with a population that was fifty percent German or 
greater (Map 1.2).
52
 In a less than an ideal state of affairs, a total of 2,806,000 Germans and 
750,000 Czechs subsequently came under the jurisdiction of the German Reich as a result of 
the agreement.
53
 
 
    The ‘Nečas Mission’ is a largely forgotten but vital episode in the death throes of the First 
Czechoslovak Republic. Overshadowed by Munich and largely omitted from the historical 
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record due to the efforts of Beneš himself, its importance has been lost on subsequent 
generations of historians.
54
 It was, in fact, the first serious proposal to expel the Sudeten 
Germans from their ancestral home in Bohemia and Moravia and established the suite of 
measures that would be considered throughout the war to reduce Czechoslovakia’s postwar 
German population. These consisted of three key measures that would form the basis of 
future wartime proposals: large-scale population transfers, selective expulsions and limited 
territorial revision. Throughout the course of the war the emphasis given to certain aspects of 
this formula was naturally dependent upon political conditions, however, all three measures 
survived as part of an evolving plan for the organisation of postwar Czechoslovakia. It was 
only in late 1944, as total victory over the Axis Powers became all but inevitable, that these 
three criteria gave way to a single solution: the wholesale expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. 
 
    If mid-September 1938 is taken as the point at which proposals for the removal of the 
German minority of Czechoslovakia began to be formulated, it therefore follows that the 
origins of population transfer in the Czech lands preceded the Second World War. The 
expulsion of the Sudeten German minority would therefore seem to be predicated on the 
systemic tensions of the Czech-German relationship throughout the interwar period. The 
relationship came to breaking-point in the 1930s due to both economic depression, which 
induced a domestic political crisis along ethic cleavages, and the expansionist pan-German 
foreign policy of Nazi Germany. Viewed from this perspective, rather than being the ultimate 
cause, the war provided the political circumstances by which such an ethnographic 
transformation could be realised, expanded and implemented.  
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THE UNDOING OF MUNICH AND THE ADOPTION OF THE 
PRINCIPLE OF EXPULSION 
 
    The repudiation of the Munich Agreement formed the centerpiece of Beneš’ activities as 
the leader of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. Although this topic has received 
adequate historical treatment, it is important to relay its implications on the development of 
Beneš’ expulsion policy.55 Indeed, the expulsions were only necessary in postwar 
Czechoslovakia due to the restoration of the state’s pre-Munich borders. On this issue, Beneš 
was unyielding and saw the annulment of Munich as a fundamental moral question.
56
 His 
diplomatic efforts were primarily directed towards Great Britain, since the United States and 
Soviet Union were not signatories to the Munich Agreement. Thus, the political manoeuvres 
that played out in London between Beneš and Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary, 
and Wenzel Jaksch, the leader of the Sudeten German Social Democrats, are an important 
chapter in the exile period.  
 
    From the outset of his exile, Beneš was emphatic in his belief that Czechoslovakia should 
be restored within its historic pre-Munich borders. In a report dated 21 August 1939 to the 
Czech underground resistance movement, the ÚVOD, he declared ‘the restoration of 
Czechoslovakia is today already a certainty’.57 This declaration not only predated the 
extension of any formal diplomatic recognition to Beneš and his future government-in-exile 
but also the creation thereof. The formation of the Czech National Liberation Movement 
would occur somewhat later in October 1939 after the outbreak of war and full diplomatic 
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recognition was only granted to the Beneš Government in London in July 1941.58 Beneš’ 
claim, however presumptuous, was in fact more than wishful thinking on the part of an exiled 
national leader in the possession of enormous self-belief. In the same report, Beneš went on 
to outline the pragmatic approach he would take in exile to regain Czechoslovak 
independence:  
 
For the time being, of course, not even we ourselves can say under what 
conditions and within what boundaries. The fight on these issues is 
about to begin and it will depend exclusively on the way the war 
develops, on the situation under which peace is achieved, what will 
happen also on our territory, who will be in the war and who will keep 
out of it. It is self-evident that we will have to start cautiously. Our 
demands will for the time being be put forward with reserve and then 
we will gradually try as resolutely as possible for the attainable 
maximum.
59
 
 
Beneš’ exposition of the challenges facing the exile movement revealed his understanding, 
gained during the previous conflict with Germany, of the vicissitudes of political fortune and 
his awareness that they could be turned to Czechoslovakia’s advantage during the course of 
the war. Indeed, the possible means that Beneš laid out in late-1939 for attaining the 
maximum postwar territorial settlement for his countrymen was particularly far-sighted and 
the Czech leader did well to follow his own pragmatic advice. 
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    From the outset of his dealings with the British Foreign Office and Jaksch’s Social 
Democrats, Beneš engaged in a double game of Machiavellian proportions in order to bring 
about the annulment of the Munich Agreement and a favourable settlement over the future of 
the German-speaking border regions. In order to reclaim the Sudetenland, Beneš had to 
assure Eden and the Foreign Office that its inclusion would not cause any future 
Czechoslovak state to suffer the same fate as its interwar predecessor.
60
 His solution from the 
outset was to reduce the size of the German population, although he did not reveal any 
specific proposals to Eden until the beginning of 1942.
61
 Concurrently, Beneš and Milan 
Hodža were conducting negotiations with Jaksch’s Social Democrats over the entry of the 
latter into the Czechoslovak State Council.
62
 Wartime cooperation between both of these anti-
Nazi groups was highly sought after by the Foreign Office and was a condition for further 
diplomatic recognition for the Czechoslovak government-in-exile.
63
  
 
    Negotiations began during the summer of 1939 on the express understanding that no 
population transfer of the Sudeten German minority would occur after the war. The first 
meeting between Beneš and Jaksch took place at the former’s Putney residence on 3 August 
1939, and was followed by a second on 4 December after the outbreak of war.
64
 Beneš also 
met with the Sudeten German Social Democrat representatives Franz Kögler, Robert Wiener 
and Fritz Kessler on 3 September
 
in order to discuss the possibility of wartime cooperation.
65
 
In all three meetings, Beneš rejected any claim that he intended to expel the Sudeten German 
minority after the war. According to Jaksch’s postwar recollections, the Czech leader 
declared that ‘we shall in any case have many German citizens’ after the war and that any 
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talk of expulsions was ‘nonsense’.66 This account would seem to correspond with Beneš 
claim in his memoirs that he sought to conceal any expulsion plans from Jaksch.
67
 
 
    The prospect of Czech-German cooperation, however, reached an impasse in 1941 before 
finally dissolving in 1942.
68
 The main reason for this outcome was that London became more 
forthcoming in its support for Beneš after the massacres and reprisals carried out by Nazi 
authorities throughout the Protectorate in retribution for the assassination of Reichsprotektor 
Reinhard Heydrich as part of the Czechoslovak-led Operation Anthropoid.
69
 Indeed, in a 
memorandum presented to the War Cabinet in July of the same year Eden stated: 
 
In the view of the hard trials through which the Czechoslovak people 
have been passing since the death of Heydrich, I consider it desirable, 
mainly for psychological reasons, to give Dr. Benes such satisfaction as 
is possible.
70
 
 
Soon after, Eden presented a draft formula approved by the War Cabinet to Beneš, Jan 
Masaryk and Hubert Ripka that went a long way towards recognising the key demands of the 
Czechoslovak delegation.
71
 It reaffirmed Churchill’s declaration of 30 September 1940 that 
the Munich Agreement had been ‘destroyed by the Germans’ and further stated that the 
British Government ‘regard themselves free from any engagements in this respect’ and ‘will 
not be influenced by any change effected since 1938’.72 With this statement, Britain joined 
                                                        
66
 Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, pp. 357-358. 
67
 Beneš, Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš, p. 214. 
68
 Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, p. 355. 
69
 Evans, The Third Reich at War: How the Nazis Lead Germany from Conquest to Disaster (London: Penguin, 
2009), pp. 275-276. 
70
 BNA, CAB 66/26/10, Eden, ‘Anglo-Czechoslovak Relations’, Memorandum, 2 July 2 1942, p. 1. 
71
 Eden, ‘Mr. Eden to Mr. Nichols (No. 154)’, p. 1. 
72
 Eden, ‘Mr. Eden to Mr. Nichols (No. 154)’, p. 2. 
 63 
the United States (May 1939) and the Soviet Union (June 1942) in declaring Munich null and 
void.
73
 The prospect of expulsions, however, was not included in the formula, although the 
matter had been discussed on 2 July by the War Cabinet. Eden informed his colleagues of 
Beneš’ proposal for a sizeable population transfer, which had first been communicated to the 
Foreign Office in January 1942, and concluded his deliberations with the following 
statement: 
 
A population transfer on this scale would be a formidable undertaking. 
It will probably be impossible to avoid some measure of this kind in 
post-war Europe, but, if they are not carried out in an orderly and 
peaceful manner it is only too likely that the Czech and Polish 
populations will forcibly expel the German minorities from their midst. 
The question is whether we should not commit ourselves to the 
principle of such transfers, and let both Dr. Benes and the Sudeten 
German representatives know that this is our view. I should not be in 
favour of discussing the application of the principle until a much later 
stage.
74
 
 
The fact that Eden was now open to the large-scale population transfer of the Sudeten 
Germans represented a significant progression from six months earlier when he had been 
reluctant to consider the idea at all.
75
 On 6 July, the War Cabinet adopted in principle the 
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population transfer of German minorities throughout Central and Eastern Europe after the 
war.
76
 
 
    Between September 1938 and August 1942, the fortunes of Beneš and his Czech 
compatriots underwent a propitious transformation. With the repudiation of Munich and the 
adoption of the principle of expulsion, the Czechoslovak leader had achieved his immediate 
goals for a new postwar settlement. In large measure, his success can be attributed to his 
skilful, if double-handed, management of the Sudeten German Social Democrats and the 
British Foreign Office. By concealing his true intentions until he could be sure of British 
support, Beneš was able to dispense with Jaksch and after August 1942 no longer sought nor 
required an understanding with the Social Democrats. 
 
WARTIME PLANS FOR EXPULSION: CZECH AND BRITISH 
PERSPECTIVES  
 
    As has already been outlined, plans for the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans had begun in 
September 1938 on the initiative of President Beneš. Had the policy of Anglo-French 
appeasement continued and war been averted, such plans would have come to naught and 
been consigned to the dustbin of history. The outbreak of the Second World War, however, 
provided a new scenario in which the possibility of expulsions could again be considered. 
Between 1940 and 1945, many proposals were considered, although more humane options 
that included contingencies for re-settlement and compensation were ultimately overtaken by 
wartime events. The Czechoslovak government-in-exile put forward a number of proposals 
during the war, and of these, those presented to Anthony Eden in January 1942 and the 
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European Advisory Commission November 1944 most clearly demonstrate how Czech 
demands increased during the course of the war.
77
 In addition, the Foreign Office had the 
Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) produce two reports in 1940 and 1942 on 
population transfers in Axis-occupied Europe under the chair of Professor John Mabbott of 
Balliol College, Oxford.
78
 The Memoranda on Frontiers of European Confederations and 
Transfer of German Populations of 20 February 1942 is the most informative on the matter 
of the extent and perceived consequences of the transfer of German minorities in postwar 
Europe.
79
 From this study emerges a clear picture of the degree to which the Foreign Office 
understood the implications of uprooting millions of Germans from their ancestral homes and 
forcing them into a much reduced and war-torn postwar Germany.
80
 
 
    The first Czechoslovak wartime plan for the mass removal of Sudeten Germans that was 
presented to the Foreign Office in January 1942 bore significant resemblance to the Nečas 
offer of September 1938. Although this proposal was less ambitious in its goal of reducing 
the overall size of the Sudeten German population, it built upon the earlier plan by 
introducing a three-point program of territorial cession, population transfer and expulsion. In 
a meeting with Eden on 21 January, Beneš outlined these key measures. The Czechoslovak 
President was willing to cede territory to Germany that had limited strategic value in the 
west, north and north-east (including the Egerland-Karlsbad Triangle), which contained 
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between 600,000 and 700,000 Germans.
81
 In return, Beneš asked for the right to evict two 
Germans from the remaining Czech lands for every inhabitant of the transferred territory. 
These Germans would be divided into two categories: those to be expelled as war criminals 
and associates of the Nazi authorities, numbering an estimated 300,000 to 400,000, and 
removal by population transfer of an additional one million Germans.
82
 The combined effect 
of all three measures would reduce the size of the pre-war Sudeten minority from 3,200,000 
to a little over one million (Table 2.1). The similarities between the plans of January 1942 
and September 1938 are striking. Both involved the sacrifice of non-strategic German-
speaking territory in order to obtain the right to forcibly remove a far greater number of 
Germans from the integral Czech borderlands and interior.  
 
    The latter plan, however, would have ceded more territory to Germany, and for this reason, 
Beneš asked that it remain secret as it might be ‘quoted against him later’.83 If the proposal 
had become official, it would have both attracted considerable personal criticism of Beneš 
from extreme elements within the ÚVOD in Prague, and permanently impaired relations with 
Jaksch. The Social Democrats had made clear that they were unwilling to accept the principle 
of expulsion from the outset of their negotiations with the Czech leaders.
84
 Nonetheless, 
Beneš had presented Jaksch with a number of expulsion proposals in September 1942 after 
gaining the agreement of the War Cabinet to the principle of expulsion in July 1942.
85
 None, 
however, revealed the true extent of the number of Germans to be expelled. Beneš’ 
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suggestion that any expulsions would be limited to between 600,000 and one million persons 
was duplicitous, given his earlier indications to the Foreign Office and the ÚVOD.
86
 
 
    The hardening of anti-German sentiment after the Nazi atrocities of June 1942 and the 
formal annulment of the Munich Agreement in August created a political situation in which 
more comprehensive population transfers could be considered. From this point onwards, 
Beneš displayed greater reluctance to cede territory to Germany, and therefore came to rely 
upon the method of expulsion to create the sweeping ethnographic changes desired by his 
government. In this endeavour, he was greatly assisted by growing support from the United 
States and the Soviet Union. During the course of 1943, Beneš made considerable progress in 
obtaining commitments from Roosevelt and Stalin to support his postwar policy for 
Czechoslovakia.
87
 In mid 1943, Beneš toured the United States and had meetings with the 
leading figures of the Roosevelt Administration, including the president himself.
88
 In 
discussions with Roosevelt in May and June, Beneš twice received assurances that the United 
States would agree to the transfer of ‘as many [Germans] as possible’.89 A similar 
commitment was given by Stalin and Molotov during Beneš visit to the Soviet Union from 
November to December 1943, during which he renewed the 1935 security treaty in a new 
Czech-Soviet Pact. 
90
 
 
    Having obtained the support of the Big Three to the principle of expulsions by the closure 
of 1943, Beneš was able to contemplate the ‘attainable maximum’ for which he had dreamed 
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in 1939. This found its expression in a new expulsion proposal presented by the Czechs to the 
European Advisory Commission in November 1944 (Table 2.1).
91
 On the question of 
‘transfers’, Beneš now insisted that all but 800,000 Germans would be expelled from 
Czechoslovakia.
92
 As he was only prepared to surrender territory inhabited by 350,000 to 
400,000 Germans, this would mean the expulsion of nearly two million, which was 
considerably more than had been proposed under the 1942 program. It is not surprising that 
such a drastic increase caused much consternation in the Foreign Office. Before Beneš 
departure to recently liberated Slovakia in February 1945, Eden cautioned reserve until the 
matter of German minorities could be discussed by the principal Allied Powers at a peace 
conference.
93
 On this meeting, Eden wrote to Sir Philip Nichols: 
 
His Excellency [Beneš], while not disputing that this might be a wise 
course, said nothing which could be interpreted as acceptance of this 
advice, and I am left under the strong impression, that, unless we 
reinforce this advice in some way, he may, on his return to his own 
country, commit himself on this subject to his people.
94
 
 
    No doubt, Eden was aware of the consequences of an expulsion of the magnitude proposed 
by the Czechoslovak President. Indeed, the challenges of economic dislocation, 
transportation, resettlement, compensation, and reconstruction arising from the mass 
expulsion of German minorities from Central and Eastern Europe had been outlined by 
Professor Mabbott in the FRPS report of February 1942, which estimated that if expulsions 
were to proceed after the war, the number of Germans to be uprooted would be in the vicinity 
                                                        
91
 BNA, FO 371/46810, ‘Transfer of Populations to Germany’, Memorandum 16 March 1945, p. 1. 
92
 Eden, ‘Mr. Eden to Mr. Nichols (No. 13)’, pp. 1-2. 
93
 BNA, FO 954/4A/1041, Eden, ‘Mr. Eden to Mr. Nichols (No. 38)’, 23 February 1945, p. 1. 
94
 Eden, ‘Mr. Eden to Mr. Nichols (No. 38)’, p. 2. 
 69 
of three million to 6,800,000.
95
 This figure turned out to be surprisingly accurate, especially 
given that the report did not anticipate the westward movement of the German-Polish border 
to the Oder-Neisse Line, which increased the number of Germans to be expelled from Poland 
alone from 3,300,000 to approximately 9,600,000.
96
 If Mabbott’s figures of February 1942 
are adjusted for the redrawing of the Polish border, the total number of expellees reaches a 
maximum figure of somewhere between 12 and 14 million – the actual number of Germans 
that were expelled in the postwar period. The potential scale of these transfers was indeed 
unprecedented, and with this in mind, Mabbott suggested that a timeframe of ten years would 
be necessary to achieve them in an ‘orderly’ manner.97 This assumption was based upon the 
time required for earlier population transfers in the Balkans, South Tyrol and Eastern Europe. 
For example, the Greek-Bulgaria exchange involving some 170,000 persons took place over 
six years, the larger Greco-Turkish exchange of 550,000 over two years and the South Tyrol 
transfer of 180,000 over a year with a three year extension for property settlement.
98
 In the 
event, the expulsion of nearly three million Germans from Czechoslovakia was completed in 
little more than one year.
99
  
 
    When Allied leaders grasped the full implications of expelling millions of Germans in mid-
1945, it was too late to repudiate the blank cheque that had been given to the leaders of 
Czechoslovakia and Poland to purge their homelands upon liberation. Indeed, Churchill only 
began to express misgivings during the proceedings of the Potsdam Conference.
100
 By this 
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time, nearly one million Germans had already been evicted from Czechoslovakia before any 
formal agreement had been reached on the question of transfers (Table 2.2).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
71
 
Table 2.1. Expulsion Proposals Presented by President Beneš to the Allied Powers 
 
 
September 1938 % January 1942 % November 1944 % 
Reduction by Territorial Cession 500,000 – 550,000 16 – 17 600,000 – 700,000 19 – 22 350,000 – 400,000 11 – 13 
Reduction by Population Transfer 1,500,000 – 2,000,000 47 – 63 900,000 – 1,000,000 28 – 31 1,250,000 – 1,300,000 39 – 41 
Reduction by Expulsion* – – 300,000 – 400,000 9 – 13 500,000 15 
Estimated wartime casualties – – – – 250,000 8 
TOTAL 2,000,000 – 2,550,000 63 – 80 1,800,000 – 2,100,000 56 – 66 2,400,000 75 
Remaining German Population** 650,000 – 1,200,000 20 – 37 1,100,000 – 1,400,000 34 – 44 800,000 25 
 
* In the 1942 proposal, Beneš intended ‘expulsion’ as a separate measure for war criminals. 
** Assuming a pre-war population of 3,200,000 (1930 Census). 
 
Table 2.2. Number of Germans Expelled from Czechoslovakia, 1945 – 1946 
 
‘Wild’ Expulsions (pre-August 1945) 700,000 – 800,000 
Potsdam Protocol (August 1945 – October 1946) 2,100,000 – 2,250,000 
TOTAL 2,900,000 – 2,950,000 
Remaining German Population (October 1946) 250,000 – 300,000* 
 
 * The majority of those Germans that were not expelled had emigrated by 1948.  
 
Source: Piotr Pykel, ‘The Expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia’, in Steffen Prauser and Arfon Rees, eds., The 
Expulsion of the ‘German’ Communities from Eastern Europe at the End of the Second World War, EUI Working Paper 
HEC No. 2004/1 (Florence: European Universities Institute, 2004), pp. 18-20. 
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III 
SAFEGUARDING DEMOCRACY 
  
COLLECTIVE GUILT AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE POSTWAR ORDER 
~ 
After the First World War about seventy or eighty percent of our German nationals 
failed to grasp the democratic revolution that we Czechs had gone through. They 
accepted the pan-German counter-revolution and Nazism instead. It will be necessary 
to cleanse the Republic of guilty citizens even if there are hundreds of thousands of 
them.
1
 
─Edvard Beneš 
No one who has seen and heard what the Germans did in this country can doubt that it 
is impossible now to keep Germans here as citizens. This terror wasn’t the act of a few 
SS men. It was really the expression of the spirit of a whole people. The Germans have 
to go.
2
 
─A. J. P. Taylor 
 
    In what was to become a conspicuous scene across war-torn Europe, an impecunious 
seventy-year old woman found herself far from home at an unknown train station.
3
 Given 
only ten minutes to flee from Silesia, her only possession was a Bible.
4
 Such was the fate of 
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millions of German refugees forced to leave the lands they had inhabited for nearly several 
centuries in the aftermath of the Second World War. The vast majority, often peasants and 
townspeople, had little or nothing to do with the Nazi regime; however, they were 
nonetheless connected by language and ethnicity with the Germanic race. In the context of 
1945, this association alone was enough to justify their expulsion as punishment for their 
complicity in the crimes of the Nazi regime. 
 
    One of the most startling aspects of the German expulsions must surely be how the liberal 
democracies of Britain and the United States and liberal-minded statesman, such as President 
Beneš,  chose to deny the most basic of human rights to millions of Germans on the premise 
of collective guilt. For much of the postwar period, their role in the expulsion of twelve to 
fourteen million Germans was a chapter of the war preferred to be forgotten.
5
 The similarities 
between the Allied-condoned expulsions and the atrocities committed by the Nazis were far 
too uncomfortable to contemplate for most contemporary participants and observers, and in 
any case, the expulsions were clearly at odds with the over-arching narrative of the war that 
celebrated the triumph of democracy and liberalism over totalitarianism and fascism. Yet, at 
the time, the forced removal of German minorities was perceived as a necessary measure for 
peace and the consolidation of democracy by expelling anti-democratic ‘Nazified’ elements 
from the reconstituted states of Central and Eastern Europe.
6
  
 
    It is crucial to understand the central paradox of the postwar expulsions – of the 
suppression of democratic principles by the Western democracies in order to facilitate 
forcible state-led ethnic cleansing analogous to the deeds of Nazism. Scholars have too often 
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either dismissed this act as a lapse of conscience on the part of Britain and the United States 
in the hour of victory, or more simply, adopted the assumption that the German people 
deserved to be punished for Nazism, and in 1945, the removal of German minorities from 
lands beyond the German state seemed a reasonable, if barbarous, course of action. Both of 
these interpretations are fundamentally lacking in historical rigour and do not contemplate the 
possibility that the expulsions, if considered within the prism of 1943–1945, were viewed as 
a crucial component in the reconstruction of Europe around functional, social-democratic 
national states.  
 
    Indeed, in the mind of President Beneš, the removal of the Sudeten Germans would 
provide the demographic foundations that would allow the repudiation of national rights and 
the adoption of the individual rights of the citizen.
7
 It was his firm belief that with the 
removal of German minorities from Poland and Czechoslovakia, these countries would be 
allowed to prosper as democratic nation-states and thus avoid the fate of their multiethnic 
predecessors of the interwar period. In other words, Western statesmen and their Czech and 
Polish counterparts decided that it was necessary to commit the excess of expulsion in order 
to guarantee regional stability in East-Central Europe. This blatant contradiction between the 
advocacy of democracy and citizenship on the one hand and the execution of mass expulsions 
on the other has perhaps been summed up best by the legal historian A. W. Brian Simpson:  
‘enthusiasm for human rights and hypocrisy not uncommonly go hand in hand’.8 
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GERMANOPHOBIA AND THE ‘FIFTH COLUMN’ MYTH 
 
    Of all the German minorities of interwar Europe, the Sudeten Germans were the most 
likely to justify the concept of collective guilt. According to well-established Czech 
nationalist pedagogy, they had, in Beneš’ words, ‘plunged a dagger in the back of the 
Czechoslovak State in 1938’ and then subsequently assisted the Nazi authorities in 
suppressing the Czech people during the years of the Protectorate.
9
 This behaviour was 
commensurate with the actions of a ‘fifth column’ – a term coined during the Spanish Civil 
War that referred to civilian elements within Madrid that supported General Franco and the 
Nationalist cause.
10
 After 1939, the term was increasingly used to cast German minorities as 
‘traitors’ and ‘saboteurs’ as part of a concerted effort by those who desired their forcible 
removal as part of the peace settlement.
11
 It is necessary, however, to re-evaluate from a 
position of critical distance the entire notion of the collective guilt of the Sudeten Germans. 
This assumption gained widespread acceptance in large measure due to the radicalising 
effects of the war – not a promising milieu for the propagation of truth – and has since 
continued to shape the historical record. 
 
    The successful campaign carried out against the Sudeten Germans by the Czechoslovak 
government-in-exile resulted in a dramatic reversal of attitudes, and particularly that of 
Britain, towards their role in the events between 1935 and 1938. At the height of the Munich 
Crisis, Neville Chamberlain’s envoy to Czechoslovakia, Lord Runciman, had been express in 
his sympathy for the Sudeten cause and had likened Prague’s jurisdiction over the 
                                                        
9
 Beneš, Radio Broadcast, 1944, in Louise W. Holborn, ed, War and Peace Aims of the United Nations, Vol. 2, 
From Casablanca to Tokyo Bay, January 1, 1943–September 1, 1945 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1948), 
p. 1036. 
10
 Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 4. 
11
 De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, p. 4. 
 76 
Sudetenland to the rule of an ‘alien race’.12 A similar sentiment was shared by Sir Joseph 
Addison, the British Minister in Prague, who once referred to the Sudeten Germans as ‘this 
Cinderella in the Czechoslovak household’.13 By 1943, however, favourable views of the 
Sudeten Germans were all but extinguished by the rising tide of anti-German sentiment, no 
doubt abetted by the vitriol expressed towards them by the Czechoslovak government-in-
exile. One of the political realities ostensibly established by Munich was that the Sudeten 
German minority had been disloyal subjects to the Czechoslovak state. Indeed, Beneš spoke 
of the necessity ‘to punish all those who, directly or indirectly, have participated in acts of 
treason and bestialities perpetrated by the Henleinites, the Nazis, and the Gestapo’.14 Such 
was the level of antipathy that Beneš felt towards the Sudeten Germans that, upon his 
resignation from the presidency in 1948, the British Ambassador to Czechoslovakia made the 
observation, in what was otherwise a generally praiseworthy political obituary, that ‘Munich 
had left him [Beneš], more even than most Czechs, with a fear and loathing of Germany 
amounting to obsession’.15 This attitude was certainly well-documented, and is pervasive 
throughout Beneš’ writings during his years in exile. 
 
    Although it is understandable that Beneš was more hostile than most to the Sudeten 
Germans, his Germanophobia was neither unique nor newly learnt. As an avowed Czech 
nationalist, Beneš had displayed a lack of sympathy with the plight of the German citizens of 
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Czechoslovakia – a tendency that was deeply grounded in Czech historical consciousness. In 
announcing his postwar program in 1941, he invoked the historic struggle between the 
Czechs and Germans and saw Nazism as the most recent manifestation of a far older pan-
Germanism.
16
 His interpretation was no doubt aided by the fact that Hitler, in his early years, 
was a disciple of the Austrian pan-German Georg Ritter von Schönerer, who Benes referred 
to as ‘a drunken and incompetent anti-Semite who hated the Czechs’.17 Such sentiments had 
long been expressed by Czech politicians. The nineteenth-century statesman and historian 
František Palacký had likened the Czech-German relationship to an uninterrupted historic 
conflict been the two peoples over the lands of Bohemia and Moravia.
18
 In this battle of 
antitheses, the heroic resistance of the peace-loving Czechs was pitted against aggressive 
German encroachment and colonisation.
19
 This was nationalist history par excellence and, 
like other conscious efforts throughout Europe to construct national identity, the historical 
narrative espoused by the Czechoslovak Republic that was founded in 1918 and restored in 
1945 celebrated its Slavic identity and Hussite past to the exclusion of its German and 
Magyar minorities.
20
 
 
    The rhetoric of a racial struggle was continuously evoked by Beneš throughout the war, 
and intensified as the full scale of Nazi atrocities became known. Even anti-Nazis, such as 
Wenzel Jaksch, were not spared. In a private conversation with Anthony Eden in January 
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1942, Beneš sought to undermine the leader of the Sudeten German Social Democrats, stating 
that it would be impossible to offer Jaksch a place on the State Council due to Heydrich’s 
oppression of the Czechs and that Jaksch was inclined to make threats against the Czechs and 
‘always carried a little pistol in his pocket’ during negotiations.21 Hubert Ripka, a Minister of 
State in the Czechoslovak cabinet, was more scathing: ‘it has been the deplorable lot of this 
German socialist to bring to a climax the work of destruction which was begun and continued 
by Henlein, the Nazi’.22 
 
    Such animosity and mistrust was given further justification by the Nazi reprisals of June 
1942. Upon his return to liberated Czechoslovakia in 1945, one of Beneš’ first ceremonial 
acts as president was to commemorate the three year anniversary of the destruction of Lidice, 
a small village in central Bohemia that had been razed by the Germans.
23
  In his address, 
Beneš was adamant in his belief that the German people bore collective responsibility for its 
destruction. He declared:  
 
Lidice is the hallmark of Nazi culture and of the German system. I say the 
‘German’ system and I add ‘Nazi’, because I cannot dissociate the German 
nation as a whole from the barbarous massacre of Lidice. I hold the entire 
German nation responsible for Nazism ...
24
 
 
    Beneš’ belief in the inherit connection between the crimes of Nazism and the German 
people was a continual theme throughout his wartime pronouncements. It was intricately tied 
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to the notion that German minorities constituted a ‘fifth column’ that were an ongoing threat 
to the new states in which they resided, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland. In the same 
month that Beneš made his Lidice address, Dr Vladimír Clementis, the Deputy Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ), echoed Beneš’ 
sentiments when he called for the removal of both the German and Hungarian ‘fifth columns’ 
that had been used as the ‘willing tools of the policy of aggression directed against the 
Republic from the outside’.25 Clementis’ speech also drew upon the notion of collective guilt 
by placing the blame for the events of 1938 solely upon the German population, stating ‘it is 
a question of removing not thousands but millions of enemies and saboteurs from our soil’.26  
 
    The idea of German minorities functioning as Nazi ‘fifth columns’ was not a belief 
universally shared amongst the Czechs’ wartime allies. In the same year that Beneš’ had 
called for large-scale population transfers to be enacted after the war, The Economist set out 
an alternative postwar order in which the ‘allocation of guilt must be measured by accepted 
canons of law’ and that ‘punishment must fall on those who are guilty in a moral and not in a 
racial sense’.27 At first inspection, Beneš’ invocation of racial themes to justify expulsion 
would seem out of step with such liberal sentiments. In many regards, this was certainly the 
case; however, his belief in the collective guilt of the Germans was also based upon their 
demonstrable disloyalty to the Czechoslovak state from the rise of the SdP in 1933 until 
liberation in 1945. The criteria he used to reach this conclusion simply marked the 
overwhelming majority of Sudeten Germans for expulsion. 
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    In terms of the guilt of the Sudeten Germans, he drew little distinction between those 
Germans that had ‘acquiesced’ as observers and those who had actively participated as 
‘collaborators’ and ‘executors’ in the crimes of the Nazi regime.28 In the President’s 
estimation, approximately ninety percent of Czechoslovakia’s Germans fell into these two 
categories.
29
  The basis for such a high figure has a complex origin. In order to claim that 
such an overwhelming proportion of the Sudeten Germans had been disloyal to the 
Czechoslovak Republic, Beneš determined their national allegiance upon the question of their 
support for Henlein’s SdP, a party that had close political and financial links with the 
NSDAP in Germany. In the 1935 parliamentary elections, the SdP had polled two-thirds of 
the German vote, and in the May 1938 municipal elections in the Sudetenland the party’s 
support increased to between 82 and 85 percent, and in some districts this figure reached as 
high as 90 percent of the vote.
30
 The size of the party’s membership was equally impressive. 
After only two years since its formation in 1933 the SdP had 400,000 members, and its 
membership continued to climb to 770,000 in March 1938 and then dramatically increased to 
1,300,000, or 40.6 percent of the Sudeten German population, in July 1938 after the 
Anschluss.
31
  
 
    The immense electoral and popular support enjoyed by the SdP would seem to justify 
Beneš’ assertion that the overwhelming majority of the Sudeten Germans harboured 
irredentist objectives and had openly flirted with Nazism. This would certainly be the case if 
voting intentions were taken as the only criteria. A more accurate barometer of where 
national loyalties truly lay was the Sudeten response to mobilisation orders issued during the 
                                                        
28
 Beneš, ‘The Lesson of Lidice’, p. 191. 
29
 AKPR, LA, Carton 22, Vystrizky z anglichych novin, 1945, John Fisher, ‘“Wholehearted Unity” in 
Czechoslovakia: Dr Benes Talks of His Plans’, Daily Telegraph, 3 August 1945. 
30
 Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 146; Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, p. 291. 
31
 Cornwall, ‘The Manoeuvres of the Henlein Movement in Czechoslovakia’, p. 137; Michael Mueller, Canaris: 
The Life and Death of Hitler’s Spymaster, trans. Geoffrey Brooks (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 2007), p. 127. 
 81 
May Crisis of 1938. In response to reports of German military movements on the 
Czechoslovak border, a partial mobilization was ordered by the Minister of National Defence 
on 21 May.
32
 According to Wenzel Jaksch, as reservists occupied the border forts of the 
Sudetenland a ‘political paradox’ took place: Sudeten German men of military age obeyed 
mobilisation orders and members of the SdP did not attempt insurrection or mutiny at the 
prospect of fighting their German brothers.
33
 Cowed by the display of Prague’s resistance to 
invasion, party members quietly removed the swastika from public buildings overnight.
34
 
Hubert Ripka recounts a similar course of events that took place on 11 September 1938.
35
 A 
series of revolts were instigated in the Sudetenland on the eve of the Munich Crisis by some 
more extreme elements within the SdP. They failed, however, to gain any active support from 
the majority of Sudeten Germans.
36
 Indeed, according to Ripka, ‘in several places Henlein’s 
extremist agitators were driven away by actual members of the Sudeten-German Party’.37 
This remarkable behaviour, which indicated the limit of the Sudeten Germans’ support for 
the SdP, led Ripka to remark in the lull between Munich and the outbreak of the Second 
World War that: 
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This is surely proof … that the majority of the Sudeten Germans were not in 
sympathy with revolutionary National Socialism … If it had been true that 
the majority of the Sudeten Germans really regarded Hitler, represented 
among them in the person of Henlein, as their leader, one might have 
expected them to grasp eagerly at this opportunity to revolt and free 
themselves from the Czech yoke.
38
 
 
    The accounts of both Jaksch and Ripka cast doubt upon the conventional wisdom that the 
majority of Sudeten Germans harboured irredentist goals, and thus, raise important questions 
about the justification for their expulsion. Their unwillingness to revolt against Prague at the 
opportune moment and unite with the German Reich would seem to support Jaksch’s claim 
that the Sudeten Germans were not voting for separation from Czechoslovakia, but rather 
thought that they could attain the long desired goal of political and cultural autonomy by 
supporting Henlein and the SdP.
39
 This conclusion is supported by a close reading of the 
SdP’s platform that, until the party came firmly under the control of Hitler after the 
Anschluss, only demanded territorial autonomy for the Sudetenland within a federal 
Czechoslovak state.
40
 
    
    Despite the inherent flaws in determining the collective guilt of the Sudeten Germans upon 
the electoral support enjoyed by the SdP, Ripka came to distance himself from his pre-war 
statements and subscribed to Beneš’ opinion that the overwhelming majority of 
Czechoslovakia’s Germans were culpable of treason and of ‘wholeheartedly furthering the 
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aggressive schemes of Hitler’s Third Reich’.41 In a 1944 polemic on the future of the Sudeten 
Germans, Ripka wrote: 
 
It should be borne in mind that the Germans in the Czech territories, ever since last 
century, have been zealous adherents and advocates of the doctrine of the German 
Herrenvolk ... the genuine anti-Nazis and anti-Fascists among the Sudetic Germans 
constituted only a small minority, less than one-third until 1938, and from Munich 
onwards even this small amount has been still further reduced.
42
 
 
    The notion that the Sudeten Germans were a ‘Nazified’ fifth column, despite contrary 
evidence, had become a generally accepted fact by the time that President Beneš began to 
articulate his expulsion plans to the Big Three in 1942–1943. By determining German guilt 
upon the electoral support of the SdP, Beneš and his political colleagues ensured that the 
overwhelming majority would be expelled. Indeed, there is a striking parallel between the 
250,000 to 300,000 Germans that remained in Czechoslovakia after the expulsions – slightly 
less than 10 percent of the pre-war population – and the number of Germans that supported 
the anti-Nazi Social Democrats in the 1938 municipal elections. 
 
A NEW CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS? 
 
    In October 1945 at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, John Foster Dulles 
outlined the key tenants that would govern the postwar order: territorial settlements that 
conformed to the will of the inhabitants concerned, an international bill of rights that would 
protect human dignity and fundamental freedoms for all, and the return to principles of 
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morality in international affairs.
43
 This ambitious program had been promulgated at the San 
Francisco Conference, at which Dulles had been a senior advisor, by the founding members 
of the United Nations and was an attempt to articulate the ideals for which the Western Allies 
had fought the Second World War. Two months before Dulles speech, however, the Allied 
Powers had agreed at Potsdam to the ‘orderly and humane’ transfer of German minorities 
from Central and Eastern Europe, including the removal of 2,500,000 from Czechoslovakia.
44
 
Those Germans to be expelled would not be entitled to the rights and privileges of this new 
world order; they would be unable to make their views known through democratic means 
and, unlike previous population transfers, would be denied the option of departing or 
remaining in their homeland. 
 
    The spectre of millions of Germans fleeing their homes under the threat of retribution is 
difficult, nigh impossible, to reconcile with the high ideals that were proclaimed first in the 
Atlantic Charter of 1941, and then in 1945 at Potsdam and San Francisco. Nonetheless, some 
historians have sought to discover the cold rationalism under which two such contradictory 
phenomena could take place.  Mark Mazower, for example, has argued that ‘behind the 
smokescreen of the rights of the individual ... the corpse of the League’s minorities policy 
could be safely buried’.45 This argument presents two great ironies. Firstly, the repudiation of 
minority rights required the mass expulsion of national minorities in order to dissolve ethnic 
tensions in Europe and thus establish a political and demographic environment that would 
enable the protection of individual rights within homogenous nation-states. Secondly, the 
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adoption of a universal, and what was to prove unenforceable, human rights regime allowed 
the Big Three a degree of deniability on the issue of the expulsions. As a result, they were 
able to shift the moral responsibility for the eviction of millions of German upon their 
wartime allies in Prague and Warsaw. This abnegation of responsibility was evident in the 
many protestations of London and Washington between 1945 and 1946 at the barbaric nature 
of the expulsions, which the Allies had authorized, and their alarm at the burden placed on 
occupation authorities in Germany by the chaotic arrival of expellees in the American, British 
and Soviet zones.
46
 
 
     It should be remembered, however, that from the outset the precepts of the Allies’ new 
world order were not intended to be enjoyed by all nations and peoples. The Atlantic Charter, 
which has been lauded as the founding document of the postwar order, was deeply 
ambiguous and bore many of the hallmarks of war propaganda.
47
 Although the charter had 
forbade ‘territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples 
concerned’ and respected ‘the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under 
which they will live’, these rights and privileges would not be exercised by the inhabitants of 
enemy nations or by those of European colonies.
48
 Indeed, Churchill had been forthright on 
the extent to which its guiding principles would apply, telling the House of Commons: 
 
... the Atlantic Charter in no way binds us about the future of Germany, nor 
is it a bargain or contract with our enemies. It was no offer to the Germans 
to surrender ... the principle of unconditional surrender, which has also been 
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promulgated, will be adhered to as far as Nazi Germany and Japan are 
concerned, and that principle itself wipes away the danger of anything like 
Mr. Wilson’s Fourteen Points being brought up by the Germans after their 
defeat ...
49
 
 
    The political contradictions and apparent hypocrisy of politicians and bureaucrats in the 
1940s on the issue of human rights is only explicable if the period is viewed as a transitional 
decade, during which those who professed the ideals and values of a postwar order looked to 
the future and those charged with the conduct of war looked to the past. In some notable 
cases, these roles overlapped. How else could President Beneš have proclaimed in the same 
speech in liberated Prague the promise of ‘a new humanity – a humanity better, more 
complete, more beautiful’ while also absolving the Czechs of any guilt over the expulsion of 
the Sudeten Germans: ‘in no way have we sinned against our human dignity, or against our 
great national tradition’.50 It was one of the bitter ironies of the twentieth century that such 
political ideals and odious practices could go hand in hand. 
 
A NEW CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS VS . 
NATIONAL RIGHTS 
 
    The collective punishment of the Sudeten Germans can be traced back to the interwar 
minority rights regime. In order to protect the rights of national groups without a state, the 
minority treaties had created specific collective political and cultural rights.
51
 As a result, 
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they bequeathed a group identity to disenfranchised minorities – a phenomenon that would 
have significant ramifications across the next three decades. For the Czechoslovak 
government-in-exile, the interwar experience of a democratic polity fractured along ethnic 
cleavages and divided by competing demands of Germans, Slovaks and Hungarians for 
greater political and cultural autonomy had a significant influence upon the creation of the 
postwar political system.
52
 Already inclined to treat its citizens according to their national 
identity, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile proceeded with the expulsion of Germans 
and Hungarians on the basis of collective guilt to establish a state that would ostensibly be 
structured around the ‘principle of individual freedom’.53  
 
        The intended effect of the expulsions on Czechoslovakia’s domestic politics has been a 
much overlooked aspect of the state’s postwar reconstruction. It was a widely held belief that 
the removal of the ‘anti-democratic’ Sudeten German minority would rectify a fundamental 
structural weakness that had brought down the First Republic in 1938. Unlike the failed 
democracies of Weimar Germany, Austria, Poland and Hungary that were destroyed by the 
radicalisation of the middle-classes, political authoritarianism or military coups, 
Czechoslovakia’s democracy was undone by internal ethnic tensions. Its experience was 
therefore unique in the wider context of the failure of European democracy. When historians, 
such as E. H. Carr, talked about the crisis of liberal democracy in the 1930s, or political 
theorists spoke of the ‘necessity for re-stating the democratic idea’, as did R. W. G. MacKay, 
this was typically understood to signify the creation of social democracy and the 
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neutralisation of class conflict.
54
 In Czechoslovakia, however, the reinvention of democracy 
also entailed sweeping ethnographic adjustments. 
 
    President Beneš was adamant that the democratic future of Czechoslovakia would not 
reflect the experience of its interwar past. In an address to the Masaryk Society in 1941, he 
declared that: 
     
The New European democracy must remain victorious not only on the 
military front but on the inner political front as well, and this principle must 
be carried to its consequence without compromise.
55
 
 
   Beneš’ advocacy of democratic principles was intertwined with his equally held belief that 
‘nationhood is an absolute value’.56 To entrench a stable and democratic Czechoslovak state 
in the heart of Europe, he sought to establish a national consensus among three democratic 
parties.
57
 This would represent a marked improvement upon the myriad of political parties of 
sectional interests that had beset the First Republic. In the 1935 parliamentary elections, no 
fewer than fourteen separate parties had been elected to the Chamber of Deputies and none 
approached a popular or parliamentary majority in its own right (Table 3.1). The combined 
support of parties associated with ethnic minorities rose to a staggering 32.9 percent of the 
total vote, and of this, nearly 70 percent was garnered by the German parties.
58
 More 
alarmingly to the mainstream parties that sought to protect the political status quo, the SdP 
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won two-thirds of the German vote and 15.2 percent of the total vote, making it the single 
largest party.  
 
    With the removal of Czechoslovakia’s troublesome minorities, a new democratic order did 
indeed take shape. In the 1946 parliamentary elections, the number of political parties was 
reduced to seven, of which only five could be considered as having a broad level of support, 
and the only parties that represented ‘minority’ concerns were Slovak (Table 3.2).59 The 
Communist Party emerged as the clear victor, albeit without an absolute majority of votes. 
The result was a clear vindication of Beneš’ position that the liquidation of Czechoslovakia’s 
minorities would produce a new and more cohesive national-democratic framework.
60
 It was 
the ultimate realisation of what he had envisaged in his triumphant speech upon returning to 
Prague in May 1945: 
 
It will be essential…to evacuate the Germans in Czech lands and the 
Hungarians in Slovakia in uncompromising fashion as may be best 
accomplished in the interests of a uniform national state of Czechs and 
Slovaks. Our watchword must be: a definitive clearance of Germans and 
German influence from our country in the cultural, economic and political 
spheres.
61
 
 
    The contradiction of achieving individual democratic rights and stable national statehood 
via such a profound violation of human dignity was not missed upon some contemporary 
observers. As Sir Philip Nichols remarked, the implementation of such an idea in the form of 
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mass expulsions cannot be ‘regarded as other than a bitter and ironic comment on the 
conditions existing in the twentieth-century’.62 Unlike the Nazis, who were true to their word, 
the Allies engaged in a form of ‘doublespeak’ by promising human rights while at the same 
time sanctioning ethnic cleansing at Potsdam. In the case of President Beneš, never did he 
waver in his belief that this was the right course of action to bring peace and justice to 
Europe.  
 
.   
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Table 3.1. Czechoslovak Parliamentary Elections, 19 May 1935 
 
Chamber of Deputies Senate 
Party Votes % of Votes Seats Votes % of Votes Seats 
Czechoslovak Parties             
Agrarian 1,176,593 14.3 45 1,042,924 14.3 23 
Social Democratic 1,034,774 12.6 38 910,252 12.5 20 
Communist 849,509 10.3 30 740,696 10.2 16 
National Socialist  755,880 9.2 28 672,126 9.3 14 
Populist 615,877 7.5 22 557,684 7.7 11 
National Union 456,353 5.6 17 410,095 5.6 9 
Small Traders and Artisans  448,047 5.4 17 393,732 5.4 8 
Fascist  167,433 2.0 6 145,125 2.0 Nil 
  5,504,466 66.9 203 4,872,634 67.0 101 
Ethnic Minority Parties             
Sudeten German 1,249,530 15.2 44 1,092,255 15.0 23 
Autonomous Bloc  564,273 6.9 22 495,166 6.8 11 
German Social Democratic 299,942 3.6 11 271,097 3.7 6 
German-Magyar Christian Socialists 291,831 3.5 9 259,832 3.6 6 
German Christian Social 162,781 2.0 6 155,234 2.1 3 
German Farmers' League  142,399 1.7 5 129,862 1.8 Nil 
  2,710,756 32.9 97 2,403,446 33.0 49 
Other 16,190 0.2 Nil 973 0.0   
TOTAL 8,231,412   300 7,277,053   150 
 
Source: Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), p. 12.
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Table 3.2. Czechoslovak Parliamentary Elections, 26 May 1946 
 
Constituent National Assembly (Unicameral) 
Party Votes % of Votes Seats 
Communist  2,695,915 37.8 114 
National Socialist 1,298,917 18.2 55 
Populist 1,110,920 15.6 47 
Slovak Democrat 998,275 14.0 43 
Social Democrat 905,654 12.7 36 
Slovak Freedom 67,575 0.9 3 
Slovak Labour 49,983 0.7 2 
Other 11,455     
TOTAL 7,138,694   300 
 
 
Source: Chris Cook and John Paxton, European Political Facts of the Twentieth 
Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 207. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93 
 
CONCLUSION 
~ 
I have already stated more than once in the past that evil is of an infectious nature 
and that the evil of the transfer was only a sad consequence of the evil which 
preceded it. There can be no dispute about who was the first to let the genie of 
national hatred out of the bottle. And if we, that is, the Czechs, are to recognize our 
share of responsibility for the end of the Czech-German coexistence in the Czech 
lands, we have to say, for the sake of truth, that we let ourselves become infected by 
the insidious virus of the ethnic concept of guilt and punishment... 
─ Václev Havel1 
 
    Upon his triumphant return to Prague on 16 May 1945, President Edvard Beneš declared that 
‘the Czechs and Slovaks again rise to new and great upswing, to new work and new life’.2 His 
proclamation of national liberation foreshadowed the impending tragedy that was to unfold for 
the non-Slavic inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. In the following months, Beneš would lay the 
groundwork for the ‘transfer’ of more than 2,500,000 Sudeten Germans – an event known as 
odsun in Czech and die Vetreibung in German.
3
 As we have seen, their expulsion brought about 
the fulfilment of Beneš dream of a national state of Czechs and Slovaks within the historic lands 
of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia. These former territories of the Hapsburg Empire 
had historically been a melting pot of European nationalities; however, like much of Central and 
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Republic, 2002), p. 8. 
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Eastern Europe, they were transformed in the course of the first-half of the twentieth-century by 
the guiding principle of nationalism. Where once Slavs, Germans and Magyars had coexisted 
under the aegis of multiethnic empires, state violence and nascent nationalism battered these 
intermingled communities into distinct national units. This state-led process forever 
extinguished many ethnic groups, including the Sudeten Germans – a people that counted 
among its number Sigmund Freud, Gustav Mahler, Kurt Gödel and Ferdinand Porsche.
4
  
 
     By integrating the German expulsions into the broader historical themes of the twentieth 
century, this thesis has sought to shed a greater light upon the motivations and processes that lay 
behind them. It has also sought to demonstrate how the postwar expulsions formed part of and, 
in many regards, completed the process by which the continent of Europe was transformed into 
homogenous nation-states. The emergence and consolidation of Czechoslovakia between 1918 
and 1945 and the ethnographic transformation left in the wake of this process was an 
emblematic feature of the restructuring of Europe around the principle of nationalism. 
 
    The origins of the expulsions in Czechoslovakia are equally tied to the travails of the interwar 
years. The failure to realise national self-determination in 1919–1920 and the half-hearted 
adoption of minority rights had a profound impact on the Czech-German relationship. The rise 
of irredentist passions and Konrad Henlein’s SdP shattered the fragile political consensus that 
had held together the First Republic. After Munich, the possibility of national coexistence was 
rejected as impossible. From this point, Beneš and, in due course, the Allied Powers, sought to 
remove the Sudeten Germans from the Czech lands. They looked to experiments of population 
transfers in the 1920s and 1930s to form a blueprint for what became one of the largest forced 
migrations of people in history. With the removal of German elements from Czechoslovakia, it 
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was hoped that the resuscitation of minority rights would prove unnecessary. For Beneš, the 
momentary excess of expulsion could be justified by the collective guilt of the Germans and by 
the results yielded: a new order in Europe that was constructed around unitary nation-states that 
could protect the rights of individual citizens. 
 
    It is easy to pass moral judgement on the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans of 
Czechoslovakia. It is harder, however, to explain how and why this historical event, still within 
living memory, took place. From the perspective of their perpetrator, President Beneš, the 
expulsions were a necessary measure to not only undo a great wrong committed against his 
country, but to also place the postwar Czechoslovak state on a more secure foundation. It is, 
therefore, hardly surprising that Beneš was certain beyond all doubt of their justice.5 
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